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The First Amendment and Religion
After Hosanna-Tabor
by MARK W. CORDES*

Introduction
The Supreme Court’s treatment of religion under the First
Amendment has shifted significantly in the past quarter century.
Though the Court had focused on separation for the Establishment
Clause and accommodation for the Free Exercise Clause for several
years, the Court has begun to increasingly shift its focus to an
emphasis on neutrality. Unlike prior years when religion was viewed
as either particularly threatening or needy, the Court has begun to
treat religion the same as other societal influences and values—no
better and no worse. Although there have been exceptions, such as
1
with regard to religion in public schools, a neutrality paradigm began
to emerge as dominant when addressing religion issues.
The growing influence of neutrality in addressing religion issues
can be seen with each of the principal clauses of the First
Amendment. With the Establishment Clause, for example, the Court
has increasingly resorted to a neutrality analysis to determine if aid to

* Professor, College of Law, Northern Illinois University; B.S., Portland State
University; M.A., Fuller Theological Seminary; J.D., Willamette University; J.S.M.,
Stanford University.
1. The Supreme Court has been particularly vigilant in monitoring religion in public
schools, striking down even minor attempts at state promotion of religion. See generally
Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577
(1992); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985). Even though government can promote
other views, it is prohibited from endorsing religion. But, in two respects, the neutrality
paradigm has been relevant to religion in public schools. First, government itself must be
neutral towards religion in public schools, neither favoring it nor disfavoring it. Second, as
will be discussed in part I, section A of this Article, government must act neutrally towards
private religious speech in a school-created public forum. See, e.g., Good News Club v.
Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 114 (2001); Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free
Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 389, 392–93 (1993).
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religious institutions, such as schools, is constitutional. Thus, if aid
flows to a religious school as part of a neutral, broad-based program
that does not define recipients by reference to religion, the program is
3
almost certainly constitutional, in stark contrast to earlier years.
But it is with religious expression or exercise that the neutrality
paradigm has become most apparent. On the one hand, under the
Free Speech Clause, the concept of neutrality has been a powerful
weapon to protect religious speech from discrimination and to ensure
its existence in public debate. With its roots in the public forum
4
jurisprudence of the 1940s and 1950s, in the 1980s and 1990s the
Court’s emphasis on content-neutrality in regulating speech became a
primary vehicle in protecting religious expression in the public forum.
Thus, in a series of five major cases, four of them decided between
1991 and 2001, the Court struck down efforts to exclude religious
expression from a government-created speech forum because of
violations of free speech, emphasizing the need for content-neutrality
5
in each case. The Court also stated in each case that the neutral
treatment of religion in such speech forums dissipated any
6
Establishment Clause concerns that might arise.
Neutrality’s greatest impact, however, came with regard to the
Free Exercise Clause. The Court’s prior emphasis on accommodation
when general laws imposed incidental but substantial burdens on
religion came to an abrupt and near total end in Employment
Division v. Smith when the Court held that the Free Exercise Clause

2. See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 652–53 (2002); Agostini v.
Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 234–35 (1997); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 7–
8 (1993); see also Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 829 (2000) (Thomas, J., plurality
opinion).
3. Prior to the 1990s, the Court frequently invalidated aid to religious schools even
when part of a broad-based and neutral program. See, e.g., Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v.
Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 397–98 (1985); Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 414 (1985); Meek v.
Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 370–73 (1975); Levitt v. Comm. for Pub. Educ., 413 U.S. 472, 481–
82 (1973).
4. See generally Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395 (1953); Saia v. New York,
334 U.S. 558 (1948) (preaching religious message by loudspeaker); Martin v. City of
Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) (distributing religious literature); Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U.S. 296 (1940) (soliciting money for religious purposes without approval of Secretary
of Public Welfare); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938) (distributing literature
without a permit).
5. See Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 120; Rosenberger v. Rector of the Univ. of Va.,
515 U.S. 819, 829–31 (1995); Lamb’s Chapel, 508 U.S. at 393–94; Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens,
496 U.S. 226, 253 (1990); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269 (1981).
6. See Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 113; Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 840–41; Lamb’s
Chapel, 508 U.S. at 395; Mergens, 496 U.S. at 248; Widmar, 454 U.S. at 274–75.
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only required neutral treatment of religion and was only triggered
7
when government targeted religion for unique burdens. As such,
Smith in effect rejected the Court’s earlier position that the Free
Exercise Clause required accommodation of religious exercise when a
generally applicable law imposed an incidental but substantial burden
8
on religion.
Thus, the increasingly dominant neutrality paradigm has been
used both to protect religious expression under the Free Speech
Clause, but also to limit religious exercise under the Free Exercise
Clause. The neutrality paradigm has been important as a means of
permitting or ensuring religion’s participation in America’s public
life. It opened the door for religious recognition in various aid
programs that had been previously closed, and it has ensured that
religion could not be denied participation in public forums based on
9
perceived Establishment Clause concerns. But when it comes to
protecting the unique needs of religious adherents, the neutrality
paradigm has been a problem. In particular, when it comes to
substantial burdens incidental to general laws, neutrality offers no
relief to religious adherents.
Indeed, one common undercurrent throughout all of these
applications of the neutrality paradigm—whether helping or hurting
religion—is that there is nothing particularly unique or significant
about religion that sets it apart from other values and beliefs in
America. For that reason, religion need not be excluded from broadbased and neutral aid programs, nor can it be excluded from general
speech fora. With regard to free speech analysis, it simply means that
religion is to be treated the same as every other view—no better and
no worse. But at the same time, there is nothing special or unique
about religion that requires constitutional exemptions from neutral
and generally applicable laws.
The Supreme Court’s decision last term in Hosanna-Tabor
Evangelical Church and School v. EEOC marked an important
departure from the neutrality paradigm. In a unanimous decision, the
Court held that the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment create a
ministerial exception to antidiscrimination laws, meaning that, at least
for certain ministerial positions, religious organizations must be
accommodated and exempted from an otherwise general and neutral
7. Emp’t Div., Dept. of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882–90 (1990).
8. Id. But cf. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398 (1963).
9. See, e.g., Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 113; Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829–31.
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law. The Court further held that the ministerial exception applied to
the employee who had been dismissed after developing narcolepsy
11
under the totality of facts of the case.
On one level, the decision in Hosanna-Tabor was neither
surprising nor expansive. The unanimous holding speaks to the
unremarkable proposition that government should not tell churches
who to hire or fire as their ministers. Indeed, every federal circuit
had already said as much, and the Supreme Court was essentially
12
adopting a long recognized lower court doctrine. And the Court was
careful to limit the holding of the case, for the time being, to the facts
before it.
But make no mistake about it: Hosanna-Tabor is an extremely
13
important decision, with several significant impacts. Though not
overturning or replacing the neutrality paradigm that has emerged in
recent decades to resolve many religion-related issues, HosannaTabor does make a significant dent in the paradigm.
Most
importantly, the decision places important limits on the neutrality
paradigm, in particular its application to internal church matters.
And in recognizing this, the Court recognized two basic principles,
the implications of which stretch far beyond the immediate facts of
the case.
First, the Court made clear that religion has a unique status
under the Constitution, being granted protection beyond what other
14
values and ideas might have under free speech. In particular, the

10. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694,
706 (2012).
11. Id. at 707.
12. See, e.g., Rweyemanu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 198, 208 (2d Cir. 2008); Hollins v.
Methodist Healthcare, Inc., 474 F.3d 223, 225 (6th Cir. 2007); Natal v. Christian &
Missionary Alliance, 878 F.2d 1575, 1578 (1st Cir. 1989).
13. For initial academic commentary on Hosanna-Tabor, see generally Michael W.
McConnell, Reflections on Hosanna-Tabor, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 821 (2012);
Douglas Laycock, Hosanna-Tabor and the Ministerial Exception, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 839 (2012); Carl H. Esbeck, Defining Religion Down: Hosanna-Tabor, Martinez,
and the U.S. Supreme Court, 11 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 1 (2012); Paul Horwitz, Colloquy
Essay, Act III of the Ministerial Exception, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 973 (2012). For criticisms
of Hosanna-Tabor, see generally Caroline Mala Corbin, Colloquy Essay, The Irony of
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC, 106 NW. U. L. REV.
951 (2012); Mark Strasser, Making the Anomalous Even More Anomalous: On HosannaTabor, the Ministerial Exception, and the Constitution, 19 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 400
(2012).
14. For a recent, in-depth discussion of whether religion should be special under the
Constitution, see generally Micah Schwartzman, What If Religion Is Not Special?, 79 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1351 (2012). After an extensive discussion, he concludes that, as a moral
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Court rejected an attempt to limit a church’s associational rights to
those it would share with other expressive groups under the Free
Speech Clause, saying that to do so would make a nullity of the
Religion Clauses. Instead, the Court applied an analysis that in effect
established an autonomy interest independent of, and more expansive
than, that afforded to expressive associations. Moreover, the tone of
the Court’s opinion was one that makes religion and religious values
unique under the Constitution.
Second and related to this, the Court in Hosanna-Tabor
essentially recognized that religious institutions have a right of
autonomy that frees them from certain types of government
interference. Though the majority opinion did not characterize it as
such, the rationales given and precedents cited all point in the
direction of a special right of autonomy that religious institutions
enjoy pursuant to their unique status under the Constitution. This
autonomy interest does not insulate religious institutions from
government regulations; far from it. But it does protect religious
organizations from government interference with their core identity
and function, such as doctrine, faith, mission, and governance. As
such, this autonomy interest acts as a counterweight to the potential
reaches of the neutrality paradigm.
This Article will discuss the potential impact of Hosanna-Tabor,
arguing that the Court in effect recognized an autonomy interest for
religious organizations that protects them from the application of
anti-discrimination laws as they relate to matters of leadership,
governance, and mission. Part I discusses the background of the
decision, examining the emergence of the neutrality paradigm for
resolving issues relating to religious rights. Part II discusses the
Hosanna-Tabor decision. Part III briefly discusses the impact of
Hosanna-Tabor with regard to two areas: (1) the limits it puts on
Smith; and (2) its expansion of religious associational rights. Finally,
Part IV briefly examines the scope of the ministerial exception, its
application to issues of governance and membership, and how the
autonomy interest intersects with the neutrality paradigm.

question, it is difficult to answer. Id. at 1426–27. But, he acknowledges that the
Constitution itself appears to bestow a special status on religion: “As a legal matter,
however, we cannot ignore the constitutional text that we have inherited. And so the idea
that religion must be special is unavoidable. The text simply makes it so.” Id. at 1426.
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Background

As noted in the introduction, in recent years neutrality has
become an increasingly important concept in resolving issues
involving religion under the First Amendment. For example, the
Supreme Court has increasingly relied on principles of neutrality to
uphold programs that provide aid to religious schools. Thus, if
government aid flows to religious groups on the same terms as to
15
nonreligious groups, it is likely to be valid.
This marks a stark
departure from previous cases where the focus was on whether the
16
aid would advance religion in some meaningful way, rather than
whether the aid was part of a neutral program.
Part I focuses on two particularly important areas where
neutrality has become important in resolving the constitutional rights
of religious adherents: the use of neutrality to protect religious
expression under the Free Speech Clause, and the use of neutrality to
limit the protection of religious exercise under the Free Exercise
Clause.
A. Religious Speech and Neutrality

Free speech doctrine has long played a central role in protecting
religious liberty. Indeed, it is fair to say that religious exercise has
been protected far more frequently by the Free Speech Clause than
by the Free Exercise Clause. The use of the Free Speech Clause to
protect religious speech finds its genesis in the public forum cases of
17
the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s. These cases, often involving religious
speech, involved the extent to which citizens can engage in expression
or expressive activities in various public contexts. In doing so, these
early speech cases established two important principles regarding
religious speech.
First, the decisions left no doubt that the
protections of free speech—only then beginning to be recognized by
the Court in a meaningful fashion—extended in full to a variety of
religious speech activities, most of which involved proselytizing in

15. See, e.g., Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 234–35 (1997); Zorbrest v. Catalina
Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 10 (1993).
16. See generally Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985); Meek v.
Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975); Levitt v. Comm. for Pub. Educ., 413 U.S. 472 (1973).
17. For examples of early Supreme Court cases using free speech doctrine to protect
religions expression, see generally Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395 (1953);
Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948); Marsh
v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941); Schneider v.
New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
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18

some manner. Second, the Court in these early cases made it clear
19
Although the
that speech restrictions must be content-neutral.
Court recognized that reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions
20
could be placed on speech, restrictions could not discriminate based
21
on content.
This focus on content-neutrality, long central to free speech
jurisprudence, has become particularly important to protecting
religious exercise over the past few decades. Indeed, in a series of
five decisions—Widmar v. Vincent, Board of Education v. Mergens,
Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District,
Rosenberger v. Rector of the University of Virginia, and Good News
Club v. Milford Central School—the Court addressed essentially the
22
same fact pattern. Each case involved a public school, ranging from
elementary schools to four-year universities, and in each case the
school decided to create what could be viewed as a forum for speech
purposes. In three of the cases, the schools created the forums for
students themselves, and in two cases the schools created forums for
community groups. In each case, however, the school denied forum
access to religious groups for fear of violating the Establishment
Clause.
In all five cases the Court ruled in favor of the religious speakers,
using neutrality both to require access for religious speech and to
mitigate Establishment Clause concerns. The Court held that
denying religious groups access to public forums on the basis of the
religious content of their speech was discriminatory and did not
comply with the Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence that limits

18. See, e.g., Saia, 334 U.S. at 561 (use of loudspeaker for preaching in park); Martin
v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146–47 (1943) (selling religious literature); Lovell, 303 U.S. at
452 (distribution of religious literature).
19. See Saia, 334 U.S. at 561; Martin, 319 U.S. at 145–47; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296, 309–10 (1940). In a slightly later case, the Court summarized the prohibition on
content regulation by stating that “government has no power to restrict expression
because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.” Police Dept. of
Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
20. Saia, 334 U.S. at 562; Martin, 319 U.S. at 143.
21. The requirement of content-neutrality was often reflected by the Court’s striking
down speech licensing schemes that gave unfettered discretion to public officials that
raised the possibility of content discrimination when issuing or denying licenses. See, e.g.,
Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 296; Schneider, 308 U.S. at 147; Lovell, 303 U.S. at 444.
22. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 102–04 (2001); Rosenberger
v. Rector of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 822–28 (1995); Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches
Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 386–89 (1993); Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226,
231–33 (1990); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 264–66 (1981).
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restrictions on free speech to content-neutral restrictions. The Court
also dismissed any concerns about violating the Establishment Clause
that might arise from including religious speech in the forum because
allowing religious groups access on the same basis as other speakers
24
would be neutral. Thus, the Court used the notion of neutrality as a
justification for both requiring access under its freedom of speech
jurisprudence and for dismissing any potential concerns stemming
25
from the Establishment Clause.
In the first of these cases, Widmar v. Vincent, the Court held that
a public university could not prohibit a religious group from using
campus facilities if it allowed other nonreligious groups to use the
26
facilities.
The Court recognized religious activities as within the
protection of the Free Speech Clause, and emphasized that the First
Amendment prohibited discrimination on the basis of speech
27
content.
The Court specifically rejected the argument that the
Establishment Clause prohibits the use of campus facilities by
religious groups, noting that permitting equal access to such groups
28
did not confer the State’s imprimatur. As long as the forum had a
secular purpose, providing equal access did not violate the
Establishment Clause; in fact, the Free Speech Clause mandates such
access.
In the next three cases, Westside Board of Education v. Mergens,
Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District, and
Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia, the
Court extended the principles of Widmar to high school settings, and
29
it continued to focus on neutrality as a key constitutional concept.
In Mergens the Court upheld the “Equal Access Act,” a congressional
statute that, in effect, extended the protections of Widmar to high

23. See Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 120; Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829–31; Lamb’s
Chapel, 508 U.S. at 393–94; Mergens, 496 U.S. at 253; Widmar, 454 U.S. at 269.
24. See Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 120; Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829–31; Lamb’s
Chapel, 508 U.S. at 393–94; Mergens, 496 U.S. at 253; Widmar, 454 U.S. at 269.
25. See Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 113, 120; Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829–31, 840–
41; Lamb’s Chapel, 508 U.S. at 393–95; Mergens, 496 U.S. at 248, 253; Widmar, 454 U.S. at
269, 274–75.
26. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 263.
27. Id. at 269.
28. Lamb’s Chapel, 508 U.S. at 274–75.
29. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 822–28; Lamb’s Chapel, 508 U.S. at 386–89; Mergens,
496 U.S. at 231–33.
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30

school campuses. A majority of the justices also stressed that neutral
treatment of religious speech in the context of a broader forum did
31
not pose Establishment Clause concerns.
Similarly, in Lamb’s
Chapel, the Court held that a church could not be denied the use of a
public school building for a film series on child-rearing when the
32
school was open to other outside groups. As in Widmar, the Court
stressed that content-neutrality requires that religious speech have
the same access to the forum as other types of speech, and that
permitting the religious group access would not violate the
Establishment Clause. The Court stressed that neutral treatment of
33
religion is constitutional. Finally, in Rosenberger, the Court held
that preventing a religious newspaper from receiving funds made
available to other student publications violated the Constitution. The
Court again stressed that excluding a religious message from a schoolcreated forum violates free speech, and permitting a religious
34
message does not violate the Establishment Clause.
In the final decision, Good News Club v. Milford Central School,
the Court again applied a neutrality analysis to protect religious
35
speech. In that case, a school district adopted regulations permitting
community groups to use school facilities for several purposes,
including “instruction in any branch of education, learning or the
arts” and for “social, civic, and recreational meetings and
36
entertainment events.” Although the school policy was interpreted
to allow groups like the Boy Scouts to meet in an elementary school,
the school prohibited the Good News Club to meet because of the
37
religious nature of their meetings.

30. Mergens, 496 U.S. at 247–52 (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion); id. at 260–62
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
31. No single opinion commanded a majority regarding the Establishment Clause
analysis. Using an analysis similar to that in Widmar, Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion
for four justices found no Establishment Clause violation. In doing so, she stressed that
the basic message of the Act was “one of neutrality rather than endorsement; if the state
refused to let religious groups use facilities open to others, then it would demonstrate not
neutrality toward religion but hostility.” Id. at 248. Justices Kennedy and Scalia, though
disagreeing with Justice O’Connor’s endorsement approach, also emphasized neutrality in
finding that allowing the group to meet would not violate the Establishment Clause. Id. at
260 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
32. Lamb’s Chapel, 508 U.S. at 395–97.
33. Id. at 394–95.
34. See Rosenberger v. Rector of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 830–32, 838–44 (1995).
35. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 102–04 (2001).
36. Id. at 102.
37. See id. at 102–04, 108.
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As in the previous cases, the Court held that excluding the
religious group from a state-created public forum violated the Free
Speech Clause, and permitting the group to use the facility on the
same terms as other groups did not violate the Establishment Clause.
This case is especially significant because of the highly sensitive
nature of religion in elementary schools, where the Court has stressed
the highly impressionable nature of young students and the need for
the Court to be particularly vigilant in order to avoid promotion of
38
religion in that context. Despite these concerns, the Court said that
exclusion of the religious message violated the group’s right to free
39
speech because the exclusion focused on the content of the message.
Moreover, as before, the Court stressed the importance of neutrality
in emphasizing Establishment Clause issues, stating that “[b]ecause
allowing the Club to speak on school grounds would ensure
neutrality, not threaten it,” the school “face[d] an uphill battle in
arguing that the Establishment Clause compels it to exclude the Good
40
News Club.”
These five cases reflect the important role that the Free Speech
Clause plays in protecting religious exercise, and, in particular, the
role that the neutrality paradigm plays in that protection. Although
the Free Speech Clause has long been an important vehicle for
protecting religious exercise, these cases involved deliberate efforts to
silence the religious voice in certain public contexts. In consistently
rejecting these attempts, the principle of neutrality emerged as a
41
double duty vehicle to protect religious speech.
First, neutrality
required that religious speech be given the same protection as any
other speech; and, second, it mitigated any Establishment Clause
42
issues that might exist.
The growing reliance on neutrality as a vehicle for protecting
religious speech has been of major importance, ensuring that
individuals and groups expressing religious values and perspectives
have full access to the public square. As such, the neutrality mandate
of the free speech doctrine has become, and will no doubt remain, a

38. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 583–84 (1987) (“The Court has been
particularly vigilant in monitoring compliance with the Establishment clause in elementary
and secondary schools.”).
39. Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 111–12.
40. Id. at 114.
41. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 830–32 (1995);
Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 393–94 (1993).
42. See, e.g., Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 114; Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 838–44.
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powerful force to ensure religion a place in the public square and
within public debate. The free speech emphasis on neutrality views
religion as a full coparticipant in America’s public life, to be received
on the same terms as any other value system. This recognition of
religion’s role in America’s public life is a particularly important one,
especially as a response to those who would seek to privatize faith.
But as important as this is, it potentially comes with a cost. The
underlying premise of an emphasis on the neutrality paradigm to
ensure religion full participation in America’s public forum is that
religion is not different in kind from other value systems. Religious
speech is to be given the same protection as other speech—no better
and no worse. In other words, there is nothing unique or special
about religion.
Neutrality works well for religion when it is being discriminated
against, as was the case in the public forum cases discussed in this
section. Neutrality works less well, though, when it seeks special
accommodation. Indeed, at the same time the Court used neutrality
to protect religious speech in the public forum, neutrality also
emerged as a powerful concept under the Free Exercise Clause, but
with the opposite result; rather than strengthening protection under
the Free Exercise Clause, it came close to eliminating it. The next
subsection will examine this development, first briefly discussing the
Court’s earlier free exercise jurisprudence and then examining the
emergence of a neutrality standard in Employment Division v.
43
Smith.
B. Neutrality and the Demise of Free Exercise

Prior to 1963, the Supreme Court gave little independent
substance to the Free Exercise Clause as a source of protection for
religious freedom. Although the Court had frequently protected
religious exercise, that protection was usually grounded in other
44
constitutional guarantees, most notably the right to free speech. On

43. Emp’t Div., Dept. of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
44. See generally Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948) (preaching religious message
by loudspeaker); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) (distributing leaflets
advertising a religious meeting); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938) (distributing
religious literature). See generally William P. Marshall, Solving the Free Exercise
Dilemma: Free Exercise as Expression, 67 MINN. L. REV. 545 (1983) (discussing Court’s
reliance on the Free Speech Clause as a means of protecting religious exercise).
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its own, free exercise had not been successfully invoked to protect
45
religious speech.
That dramatically changed in Sherbert v. Verner, where the Court
for the first time gave an expanded reading to the protections
46
provided by the Free Exercise Clause.
In Sherbert, the Court
reviewed a South Carolina statute that denied unemployment
benefits to a Seventh-Day Adventist who refused to work on
47
Saturdays because of her religious beliefs. In finding the denial of
benefits unconstitutional, the Court employed a two-step analysis for
resolving free exercise questions. First, a court must determine
whether the government is in fact infringing upon the claimant’s free
48
exercise rights. Second, if such infringement has occurred, the state
must justify the infringement by demonstrating both a compelling
49
state interest, and a narrowly tailored approach. Applying this test,
the Court held that Ms. Sherbert’s free exercise rights were violated.
The majority opinion held that Ms. Sherbert’s inability to obtain
unemployment benefits placed a substantial burden on her free
50
exercise of religion, and that the state failed to demonstrate a
51
compelling interest in not granting an exemption.
The free exercise analysis established in Sherbert was significant
in several respects. First, it made clear that even a general and
neutral law may trigger heightened scrutiny if the law, as applied to a
particular person, imposes a significant burden on religious exercise.
Second, in applying strict scrutiny, the Court’s analysis indicated that
the issue in the case was not the importance of the overall state

45. See generally Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1991) (upholding Sunday-closing
laws against assertion that they violated the free exercise of those whose religion required
that they not work on other days); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (Free
Exercise Clause did not preclude applying child-labor law to children distributing religious
literature); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (upholding law prohibiting
polygamy even as applied to those whose religion required the practice). One notable
exception to the above was the Court’s decision in Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of
Russian Orthodox Church, 344 U.S. 94 (1952), where the Court essentially held that the
First Amendment gives churches the right to pick their own clergy. The specific issue in
that case was the right of two competing Russian Orthodox churches to use a cathedral in
New York City, which ultimately turned on who was properly the archbishop. Kedroff is
discussed in section I, C, infra.
46. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
47. Id. at 400–02.
48. Id. at 403.
49. Id. at 406.
50. Id. at 403–04.
51. Id. at 407–09.
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program, including the requirement that the claimant be willing to
work on Saturdays, but whether the state must grant an exemption
from such a requirement to those with religious burdens. The effect
was to require exemptions for religious adherents whose beliefs
would be substantially burdened by the law—the very thing the Court
52
had at one time characterized as unworkable.
The free exercise analysis established in Sherbert was reinforced
53
in another major case, Wisconsin v. Yoder. In Yoder, the Court held
that Wisconsin’s compulsory education law, which mandated
education until age sixteen, violated the Amish religious belief of
54
ending formal education at the eighth grade level.
The Court
applied essentially the same two-step analysis from Sherbert, first
asking if the compulsory education law imposed a substantial burden
on religion, and, if so, whether the state had a compelling interest to
55
support the law as applied to the Amish.
After an extensive
discussion of the Amish religion, the Court concluded that the law
56
imposed a substantial burden on the Amish, and that the state did
57
not have a compelling interest in denying the Amish an exemption.
The essence of the Sherbert/Yoder analysis, which governed free
exercise jurisprudence for nearly three decades, turned on whether a
law imposed a substantial, albeit incidental, burden on religion. If so,
then the state had to show a compelling interest in denying an
58
exemption to the religion. As the Court explicitly stated in Yoder,
this two-step analysis applied even if the law was neutral and did not
59
target religion. Indeed, the challenged laws in both Sherbert and
Yoder were neutral and generally applied. Over the course of nearly
three decades the Court applied this analytical framework in a
number of cases, at times invalidating laws that unjustifiably infringed

52. See generally Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). In Reynolds, the
Court addressed whether a federal law making polygamy a crime violated the free exercise
rights of Mormons, whose religion at the time mandated polygamy as a practice. The
Court said no, drawing a distinction between practices that can be restricted, and beliefs
that cannot. To permit exemptions from general laws, as requested in the case, would
“permit every citizen to become a law unto himself,” leading to chaos. Id. at 166–67.
53. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215, 229 (1972).
54. Id. at 214–15.
55. Id. at 214.
56. Id. at 218.
57. See id. at 221, 234.
58. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 221; Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407–09 (1963).
59. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 220.
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60

on free exercise rights, but at other times finding a sufficient
61
compelling interest to deny an exemption.
This all radically changed in the Court’s seminal 1990 decision,
62
Employment Division v. Smith. In Smith, the two respondents were
dismissed from their jobs after ingesting peyote for sacramental
purposes at their Native American Church. Oregon law made the use
of peyote for any purpose, including religious purposes, a crime and a
legitimate basis for dismissal and subsequent denial of unemployment
63
benefits.
The respondents argued that criminalizing the use of
64
peyote in religious sacraments violated their free exercise rights.
Thus, the case required the Court to decide whether the religious use
of peyote could be criminalized under Oregon’s general criminal
65
prohibition of that drug.
The Court, in a 6-3 decision, held that the respondents’ free
exercise rights were not violated; but, it did so in a way that
fundamentally changed the nature of free exercise analysis. In an
opinion by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court began by stating that
although the Free Exercise Clause prohibits any restriction on what a
person believes or professes to believe, it does not necessarily protect
against all regulation of physical acts that accompany those religious
66
beliefs. The Court stated that a government regulation that only
targets physical acts of a religious nature would likely be
67
unconstitutional, but that was not the situation in this case. Rather,
68
the law before it was neutral and generally applicable to everyone.
69
Any burden on religion was incidental.
The Court conceded that it was possible to read the Free
Exercise Clause as applying to such situations, but said it was not the
only way to understand the clause, and such a reading was not

60. See generally Hobbie v. Unemp’t Appeals Comm’n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987); Thomas
v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Securing Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
61. See generally United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
62. Emp’t Div., Dept. of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
63. Id. at 874.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 874–75.
66. Id. at 877.
67. Id. (“It would be true, we think (though no case of ours has involved the point),
that a State would be ‘prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]’ if it sought to ban such
acts or abstentions only when they are engaged in for religious reasons, or only because of
the religious belief that they display.”).
68. Id. at 878.
69. Id.
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70

supported by precedent. Instead, the Court held that neutral and
generally applicable laws that impose a substantial but incidental
burden on religious exercise do not require heightened scrutiny under
71
the Free Exercise Clause.
Rather, heightened scrutiny is only
required when a law specifically targets religious practices for
72
regulation. Since Oregon’s law prohibiting peyote use was neutral
and generally applicable, the respondents did not have a free exercise
73
claim.
The Court stated that its analysis was consistent with prior cases
that did not require exemptions for religious activities under
74
generally applicable laws. It stated that the only instances where it
had held that the First Amendment prohibited application of a
neutral, generally applicable law to religious practice did not involve
the Free Exercise Clause alone, but “hybrid” situations where the
Free Exercise Clause had been invoked in conjunction with another
75
constitutional guarantee.
It was on that basis that the Court
distinguished Yoder, holding that the decision was not solely based on
76
free exercise grounds, but also on substantive due process grounds.
It also reasoned that unemployment cases like Sherbert are unique by
nature, as they require individualized government assessments and
hardship exemptions, and in such situations “religious hardships”
77
must be allowed. The Court, however, held that those are limited
exceptions to the general principle that the application of neutral,
generally applicable laws to religious conduct does not trigger
78
heightened scrutiny; anything else would result in societal anarchy.

70. Id.
71. Id. at 878–79.
72. See id. at 878.
73. Id. at 890.
74. See id. at 878–79.
75. Id. at 881–82. The Court specifically cited a number of free speech cases
involving religious speech. See generally W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnett, 319 U.S. 624
(1943) (invalidating mandatory pledge of allegiance state law challenged by Jehovah’s
Witnesses); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) (invalidating solicitation tax as
applied to distribution of religious material); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940)
(invalidating licensing scheme involving religious and charitable solicitations of money).
76. Smith, 494 U.S. at 881–82.
77. See id. at 883–84 (stating that “our decisions in the unemployment cases stand for
the proposition that where the State has in place a system of individual exemptions, it may
not refuse to extend that system to cases of ‘religious hardship’ without a compelling
reason”).
78. See id. at 888 (“Any society adopting such a system would be courting
anarchy . . . .”)
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Despite its efforts to distinguish Yoder, Sherbert, and other free
exercise cases, it was clear that the majority in Smith substantially
changed, and greatly restricted, prior free exercise doctrine—a point
emphasized by both Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion and the
79
dissenting opinions.
Unless a claimant fits into one of the two
narrow exceptions recognized by the Court, there is no free exercise
right implicated by burdens imposed by neutral and generally
applicable laws. Instead, any accommodation of unique burdens on
religious exercise must occur at the political level—a point made by
80
the majority. The Free Exercise Clause itself is limited to those rare
instances where the government intentionally targets religion with
81
unique burdens or prohibitions. The neutral treatment of religion,
even if it incidentally imposes significant burdens on religious
exercise, does not violate the Free Exercise Clause.
In a sense, the Smith Court’s paramount focus on neutrality in
free exercise analysis was the mirror image of what was occurring
with religious rights under free speech and the Establishment Clause.
In all three arenas, the Court made neutrality the central benchmark
of constitutionality, but with markedly different impacts on religious
freedom. Whereas the focus on neutrality under free speech and the
Establishment Clause enhanced religious exercise, the focus on
neutrality under the Free Exercise Clause diminished it.

79. The majority opinion drew sharp criticism from Justice O’Connor, who
concurred in the judgment, but strongly disagreed with what she saw as a reworking of
free exercise analysis. She would have applied the Sherbert/Yoder analysis, but said the
state had a compelling interest in not granting an exemption from its drug laws. See Smith,
494 U.S. at 891–907 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Justices Blackman, Brennan, and
Marshall joined the part of O’Connor’s opinion criticizing the Court’s new free exercise
analysis, but dissented to the holding, stating the state did not have a compelling interest
in not granting an exemption to the respondents. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 907–21
(Blackman, J., dissenting). Commentators have been overwhelmingly critical of the Smith
decision and its free exercise analysis. See, e.g., Vincent Martin Bonventre, The Fall of
Free Exercise: From “No Law” to Compelling Interests to Any Law Otherwise Valid, 70
ALB. L. REV. 1399, 1411–15 (2007); Richard F. Duncan, Free Exercise is Dead, Long Live
Free Exercise: Smith, Lukumi, and the General Applicability Requirement, 3 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 850, 851 (2001); Jesse H. Choper, The Rise and Decline of the Constitutional
Protection of Religious Liberty, 70 NEB. L. REV. 651 (1991). For a defense of Smith, see
generally William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U.
CHI. L. REV. 308 (1991).
80. Justice Scalia’s majority made this point, and suggested that societies like ours
which value religious freedom are likely to accommodate religious burdens through
appropriate statutory exemptions from otherwise neutral, generally applicable laws.
Smith, 494 U.S. at 890.
81. For an example of such an instance, see generally Church of the Lukumi Babalu
Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1992).
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C. Free Exercise and Church Autonomy

Smith undoubtedly reflected a major retreat of significant
protection under the Free Exercise Clause. Yet Smith and the cases
leading up to it involved religious exercise in the context of broader
societal obligations. They did not address interferences with core
church functions and church governance per se.
In a limited number of cases, however, the Supreme Court
established the principle that courts should not interfere with internal
church matters. In an early case, Watson v. Jones, the Court declined
to resolve a property dispute between antislavery and proslavery
82
factions of a church.
Noting that the General Assembly of the
Presbyterian Church had determined that the property belonged to
the antislavery faction, the Court declined to address the matter, since
83
the appropriate religious authority had already resolved it. It stated
that “whenever the questions of discipline, or of faith, or ecclesiastical
rule, custom, or law have been decided by the highest of [the] church
judicatories to which the matter has been carried, the legal tribunals
84
must accept such decisions as final, and as binding on them . . . .”
Although not grounding its decision in the Constitution as such, the
Court stated that its holding was based upon a “broad and sound view
85
of the relations of church and state under our system of laws.”
Similarly, in two more recent cases, the Court recognized that the
Constitution gives churches the right to pick their clergy. In Kedroff
v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, the issue was the right of two competing
Russian Orthodox churches to use a cathedral in New York City,
86
which ultimately turned on who constituted the proper archbishop.
A group of North American churches, which had split from the
Supreme Church Authority in Moscow, had elected one archbishop,
while the head patriarch of the church in Moscow had appointed
87
another. The New York Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the
North American churches, relying on a New York law that required
88
the election by North American churches to be authoritative.

82. Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679 (1872).
83. Id. at 718–20.
84. Id. at 727.
85. Id.
86. Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church, 344 U.S. 94,
96–97 (1952).
87. See id. at 100–05.
88. Id. at 97.
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The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the New York law
was unconstitutional. The Court stated that the disagreement over
the right to the cathedral was “strictly a matter of ecclesiastical
government, the power of the Supreme Church Authority of the
Russian Orthodox Church to appoint the ruling hierarch of the
89
archdiocese of North America.” After a review of the record, the
Court found no schism over faith or doctrine between the North
American churches and the Russian Orthodox Church that might
90
have created a new hierarchy. Thus, the Russian church remained
the final ecclesiastical authority, and the state of New York violated
the free exercise of religion by interfering with a church’s right to
appoint its religious leadership.
91
Similarly, in Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich,
the Court again affirmed that the state was constitutionally prohibited
from interfering with a church’s internal ecclesiastical governance
matters. In this case, the Holy Synod of the Serbian Orthodox
Church had removed the Bishop of the American-Canadian Diocese
of the Church and then reorganized the diocese. The removed bishop
sued in state court, challenging his removal. The Illinois Supreme
Court ultimately held that the removal proceedings violated the
92
Church’s own regulations and the removal was thus invalid.
The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that the
decision of the Illinois court unduly interfered with internal
93
governance of the church and violated the First Amendment. The
Court emphasized that under the First Amendment, courts have no
authority to substitute their own inquiry into church polity for that of
94
the relevant church governing body. It further stated:
For where resolution of the disputes cannot be
made without extensive inquiry by civil courts into
religious law and polity, the First and Fourteenth
Amendments mandate that civil courts shall not
disturb the decisions of the highest ecclesiastical
tribunal within a church of hierarchical polity, but
accept such decisions as binding on them, in their
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id. at 115.
Id. at 120.
Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976).
See id. at 697–98.
See id. at 698.
Id. at 708.
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application to the religious issues of doctrine or polity
95
before them.
These three cases—Watson, Kedroff, and Milivojevich—
established a strong principle against state interference with issues of
internal religious affairs, especially in regards to leadership and
governance. But, none of them concerned the application of broad
and general laws to church matters. Instead, they involved legislative
and judicial efforts to intervene in resolving specific church disputes.
In such circumstances, the Court made it clear that the government
had no right to interfere; instead, the resolution of such disputes
should be left to the highest relevant religious authority.
Prior to Hosanna-Tabor, the Court had not addressed the
application of broader laws, such as antidiscrimination laws, that
might conflict with matters of a church’s internal governance. The
United States Courts of Appeals and other lower courts, however,
96
have been addressing such concerns for several decades. The next
section will briefly discuss the ministerial exception that emerged
from those cases.
D. The Ministerial Exception in the Lower Courts

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, together with
comparable state legislation, prohibits employment discrimination on
a number of grounds, including race, religion, gender, and national
97
origin; the Americans with Disabilities Act prohibits discrimination
98
on the basis of disability. Each of these statutes might potentially
apply to religious institutions’ employment decisions. Title VII does
carve out one limited exception for religious institutions, permitting
them to make discriminatory employment decisions on the grounds of
99
religion.
This was obviously necessary to ensure an institution’s
100
doctrinal integrity. But, the statutory exemption expands no further
than that, making religious institutions potentially vulnerable for
other types of employment discrimination.

95. Id. at 709.
96. Id. at 710.
97. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a) (2013).
98. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et. seq. (2013).
99. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–1(a) (2013).
100. See Little v. Wuerl, 929 F.2d 944, 947–49 (3d Cir. 1991) (not allowing a religious
institution to discriminate on religious grounds would pose substantial problems under the
Religion Clauses).
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In this context, the Federal Courts of Appeal, along with other
lower courts, have recognized a “ministerial exception” to
employment antidiscrimination laws grounded in the First
Amendment. Namely, antidiscrimination laws are not applied to
employees functioning in a “ministerial” capacity in religious
101
institutions. This exception was first recognized by the Fifth Circuit
102
Court of Appeals in the 1972 case of McClure v. Salvation Army. In
this case, a female officer of the Salvation Army claimed sex
discrimination under Title VII, alleging that she was discriminated
103
against in compensation and benefits because of her gender.
The Fifth Circuit began by noting that Title VII’s statutory
exemption for religious institutions did not apply because the
104
exemption is limited only to discrimination on the basis of religion.
The court then examined whether the Constitution itself necessitates
a broader exemption, at least for a church and its ministers, that
would protect against other types of discrimination claims. Noting
that the relationship between an organized church and its ministers is
105
its lifeblood, it then reviewed Watson, Kedroff, and several other
decisions supporting church autonomy over religious matters.
Quoting Kedroff, the court stated that the “common thread” through
these opinions was that “there exists ‘a spirit of freedom for religious
organizations, an independence from secular control or manipulation,
in short, power to decide for themselves, free from state interference,
matters of church government as well as those of faith and
106
doctrine.’”
On that basis the McClure court stated that the application of
Title VII “to the employment relationship existing between . . . a

101. For an extended discussion and defense of the ministerial exception recognized
by the lower courts, see Christopher C. Lund, In Defense of the Ministerial Exception, 90
N.C. L. REV. 1 (2011). See also Joanne C. Brant, “Our Shield Belongs to the Lord”:
Religious Employers and a Constitutional Right to Discriminate, 21 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 275 (1994). For a criticism of exempting religious employers, see Caroline Mala
Corbin, Above the Law? The Constitutionality of the Ministerial Exemption From Antidiscrimination Law, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1965 (2007); Leslie C. Griffin, Fighting the New
Wars of Religion: The Need for a Tolerant First Amendment, 62 ME. L. REV. 23, 53–56
(2010); Jane Rutherford, Equality as the Primary Constitutional Value: The Case for
Applying Employment Discrimination Laws to Religion, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 1049 (1996).
102. McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972).
103. See id. at 555.
104. Id. at 558.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 560 (quoting Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox
Church, 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952)).
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church and its minister would result in an encroachment by the State
into an area of religious freedom which it is forbidden to enter by the
107
principles of the free exercise clause of the First Amendment.”
Though not labeling it a ministerial exception, it essentially
recognized that the First Amendment prohibits government
interference with the employment relationship between a religious
institution and its ministers, even as to claims of discrimination. To
hold otherwise “would result in an encroachment by the State into an
area of religious freedom which it is forbidden to enter by the
108
principles of the free exercise clause of the First Amendment.”
Other federal circuits have recognized this “ministerial
109
110
exception,” and so have a number of state courts. However, it was
yet to be recognized by the Supreme Court. Further, there was some
uncertainty on how the Court’s increasing emphasis on neutrality,
especially after Smith, would affect its analysis in determining
whether religious bodies should be exempt from neutral and
111
generally applicable employment discrimination laws. It was in that
setting that the Court decided Hosanna-Tabor.

II. Hosanna-Tabor
A. Facts

Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church operated, as part
of its mission, a small Christian school for kindergarten through
eighth grade. The church and school were part of the Missouri Synod
112
denomination. As set out by the Synod, teachers at its school are of
107. McClure, 460 F.2d at 560.
108. Id.
109. See, e.g., Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 198, 207 (2d Cir. 2008); Hollins v.
Methodist Healthcare, Inc., 474 F.3d 223, 225 (6th Cir. 2007); Werft v. Desert Sw. Annual
Conf., 377 F.3d 1099, 1100–04 (9th Cir. 2004); Starkman v. Evans, 198 F.3d 173, 175 (5th
Cir. 1999); Bell v. Presbyterian Church, 126 F.3d 328, 332–33 (4th Cir. 1997); Young v. N.
Ill. Conf. of United Methodist Church, 21 F.3d 184, 187 (7th Cir. 1994); Weissman v.
Congregation Sharre Emeth, 38 F.3d 1038, 1039 (8th Cir. 1994); Geary v. Visitation of the
Blessed Virgin Mary Parish Sch., 7 F.3d 324, 329 (3d Cir. 1993); Natal v. Christian &
Missionary Alliance, 878 F.2d 1575, 1578 (1st Cir. 1989).
110. See, e.g., Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc., v. Super. Ct., 32 Cal. 4th 527,
543–44 (2004); Williams v. Episcopal Diocese, 436 Mass. 574, 577 (2002); Egan v. Hamline
United Methodist Church, 679 N.W.2d 350, 354 (Minn. App. 2004); Weishuhn v. Catholic
Diocese of Lansing, 756 N.W.2d 483, 486 (Mich. App. 2008).
111. See Brant, supra note 101, at 300–02 (discussing tension between the ministerial
exception recognized by lower courts and Smith).
112. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694,
699 (2012).
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two types: “called” or “lay.” Called teachers are required to
complete a “colloquy” program at a Lutheran institution, requiring
completion of courses, passing an examination, and endorsement by
the Synod. A called teacher receives the title of “Minister of
Religion, Commissioned.” In contrast, lay teachers are not required
113
to have special training and are appointed by the school board.
In 1999, Cheryl Perich was initially hired by Hosanna-Tabor
school as a lay teacher. That same school year, she finished her
colloquy and became a called teacher, making her a commissioned
minister of the school. She initially taught kindergarten at HosannaTabor school, and later fourth grade. She primarily taught secular
subjects, such as math, science, language, and art, but also taught a
religion class four days a week and led the students in devotional
exercises and prayer each day. She also attended weekly chapel
114
services for the school, and twice a year led the service.
Perich became ill with narcolepsy in June of 2004 and began the
2004-05 school year on disability leave. In late January 2005, she told
the school she was ready to return to work, but the school informed
her it had already hired a lay teacher to fill Perich’s position and that
it did not believe she was ready to return. A few days later, the
congregation voted to offer Perich a “peaceful release” from her call,
offering to partially cover her health insurance costs if she would
resign as a called teacher. She refused, stating that her doctor found
her fit to return to work. After a series of disagreements, including
Perich’s statement that she “intended to assert her legal rights,” the
115
school board eventually fired Perich. She then filed a charge with
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”),
alleging her termination violated the Americans with Disabilities Act.
The EEOC then filed suit against the church, alleging that Perich had
been terminated because she threatened to file a lawsuit under the
116
Americans with Disabilities Act.
The District Court granted summary judgment for HosannaTabor, holding that the lawsuit was barred by the ministerial
117
exception.
The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the
ministerial exception did not apply. The court acknowledged the
113. Id. at 699–700.
114. Id. at 700.
115. Id.
116. See id. at 701.
117. See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 582 F. Supp. 2d 881,
892 (E.D. Mich. 2008).
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existence of the exception in appropriate circumstances, but rejected
its application under the facts of the case for two reasons. First, it
stated that Perich’s duties as a called teacher were essentially the
same as a lay teacher. Second, the court emphasized that Perich
spent most of her time teaching secular subjects, and thus religious
118
duties played only a small part of her job.
B. United States Supreme Court Analysis

The United States Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision,
reversed the Sixth Circuit, recognizing a ministerial exception
grounded in the Free Exercise Clause and holding that it applied to
119
the facts of the case.
In doing so, the Court grounded the
ministerial exception in both the Free Exercise and Establishment
Clauses, stating that “[b]oth Religion Clauses bar the government
from interfering with the decision of a religious group to fire one of
120
its ministers.” At the same time, however, the majority opinion was
written quite narrowly in identifying the types of employees that
come within the ministerial exception. Thus, though unequivocal in
its pronouncement that the Constitution bars government
interference with a religious group’s decisions regarding its ministers,
121
it purposely avoided pronouncing the extent of the exception.
The Court began its analysis, as it often does with the Religion
122
Clauses, by resort to history.
Beginning with the Magna Carta,
which guaranteed that “the English church shall be free and shall
have its rights and its liberties unimpaired,” including the right to free
123
elections, the Court discussed the church’s ongoing struggle with the
Crown in both England and the colonies regarding ecclesiastical
appointments. Noting that it was “against this background that the
118. See EEOC v. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch., 597 F.3d 769,
779–80 (6th Cir. 2010).
119. See Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 707.
120. Id. at 702.
121. See id. at 707. As the Court began its discussion of whether Perich qualified for
the ministerial exception, it stated:
We are reluctant, however, to adopt a rigid formula for deciding when
an employee qualifies as a minister. It is enough for us to conclude, in
this our first case involving the ministerial exception, that the
exception covers Perich, given all the circumstances of her
employment.
Id.
122. See McConnell, supra note 13, at 827–32 (discussing the Court’s frequent resort
to history when analyzing the Religion Clauses and its use of it in Hosanna-Tabor).
123. See Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 702.
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First Amendment was adopted,” the Court said that both Religion
Clauses were designed “so that the Federal Government—unlike the
124
English Crown—would have no role in filling ecclesiastical offices.”
The Court then showed how this basic principle of government not
interfering with ecclesiastical appointments was also reflected in the
actions of James Madison, the “leading architect of the Religion
125
126
Clauses,” who both as Secretary of State and later as President
clearly stated that the Constitution prohibited government
interference with the appointment of religious leaders. The Court
also discussed how the noninterference principle was affirmed, albeit
127
indirectly, in its decisions in Watson v. Jones, Kedroff v. Saint
128
Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in North America,
and Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for United States and Canada
129
The Court said these decisions established that
v. Milivojevich.
government must defer to the decisions of the established church
authorities on matters relating to the organizations’ internal discipline
130
and government.
The Court in Hosanna-Tabor then proceeded to the crux of the
matter: whether the Constitution recognizes a ministerial exception to
antidiscrimination laws. Noting that the federal circuit courts had
131
previously recognized such an exemption in the First Amendment,
the Court agreed, grounding it in both the Free Exercise and the
Establishment Clauses. The Court stated:

124. Id. at 703. The Court stated: “The Establishment Clause prevents the
Government from appointing ministers, and the Free Exercise Clause prevents it from
interfering with the freedom of religious groups to select their own.” Id.
125. As Secretary of State to Thomas Jefferson, the Catholic Bishop of the United
States sought Madison’s advice on who should be appointed to oversee the Catholic
Church in the new territory acquired by the Louisiana Purchase. Madison’s response was
that the selection of church leaders was “entirely ecclesiastical,” preventing the
government from offering advice on the appointment. See id.
126. As President, Madison vetoed a bill passed by Congress incorporating the
Episcopal Church in what was then part of the District of Columbia. Stating that such a
bill would violate the Establishment Clause, Madison noted that the bill went so far as
“comprehending even the election and removal of ministers.” Id. at 703.
127. Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679 (1872).
128. Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church, 344 U.S. 94
(1952).
129. Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976).
130. See Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 724–25; Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 119; Watson, 80 U.S. at
727.
131. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 705.
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The members of a religious group put their faith
in the hands of their ministers. Requiring a church to
accept or retain an unwanted minister, or punishing a
church for failing to do so, intrudes upon more than a
mere employment decision. Such action interferes
with the internal governance of the church, depriving
the church of control over the selection of those who
will personify its beliefs. By imposing an unwanted
minister, the state infringes the Free Exercise Clause,
which protects a religious group’s rights to shape its
132
own faith and mission through its appointments.
The Court then proceeded to reject two arguments advanced by
the EEOC. First, the EEOC had argued that religious groups could
seek protection against discrimination claims by asserting their right
to expressive association under the Free Speech Clause, thus negating
the need for a special rule grounded in the Religion Clauses. The
Court disagreed, saying that the EEOC’s position would apply the
same analysis to religious and secular groups, a position the Court
characterized as “hard to square with the text of the First
Amendment itself, which gives special solicitude to the rights of
133
religious organizations.”
Second, the Court also rejected the argument that its decision in
Smith precluded recognition of a ministerial exception. Although
acknowledging that the prohibition on retaliation was a “valid and
neutral law of general applicability,” as in Smith, it drew a
fundamental distinction between a church’s selection of ministers and
a religious adherent’s ingestion of peyote. In particular, the Court
stated that Smith involved the regulation of “outward physical acts,”
whereas the present case involved “government interference with an
internal church decision that affects the faith and mission of the
134
church itself.”
Thus, the Court seemed to carve out a significant
exception to the Smith analysis—one involving internal governance
matters relevant to a religious organization’s mission.
Finally, after finding a ministerial exception in the First
Amendment, the Court proceeded to determine whether the newly
recognized ministerial exception applied to the facts of the case,

132.
133.
134.

Id. at 706.
Id.
Id. at 706–07.
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135

holding that it did. The Court declined to establish a clear test for
determining when an employee qualifies for the exception, instead
stating that in this first case, it was enough to recognize that the
136
exception covered Perich under the totality of her circumstances. In
doing so, the Court emphasized four factors. First, it noted that the
137
church gave Perich the title of minister.
Second, her “title as
minister reflected a significant degree of training followed by a formal
process of commissioning.” This included taking a large number of
college-level courses in theology and ministry, endorsement of the
local Synod, and passing an oral examination by faculty at a local
138
Lutheran college. Third, Perich held herself out as a minister in a
number of ways, including claiming a housing allowance on her taxes
139
available only to ministers.
And finally, Perich’s job, though
primarily involving secular subjects, also included occasional religious
duties such as teaching religion, leading chapel twice a year, and
140
leading devotions in her class each morning. Taken as a whole, the
141
Court said Perich qualified for the ministerial exception.
The Court then said the court of appeals made three errors in
concluding Perich did not qualify for the ministerial exception. First
was not considering the title of ‘minister’ relevant to ministerial
142
exception analysis; second was giving too much weight to the fact
that lay teachers performed some religious duties if commissioned
143
ministers were unavailable; and third, the lower court put too much
emphasis on Perich’s performance of secular duties as the dominant
144
part of her work.
Although the Supreme Court noted that the
amount of time an employee spends on secular work is relevant, it
135. Id. at 707.
136. Id.
137. Id. Among other things, the church’s call to Perich included issuing her a
diploma with the title, “Minister of Religion, Commissioned.” The church also
periodically reviewed her “skills of ministry” and “ministerial responsibilities” and
provided her with “continuing education as a professional person in the ministry of the
Gospel.” Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 707–08.
140. Id.
141. The Court stated: “In light of these considerations—the formal title given Perich
by the Church, the substance reflected in that title, her own use of that title, and the
important religious functions she performed for the Church—we conclude that Perish was
a minister covered by the ministerial exception.” Id. at 708.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 708–09.
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said the issue cannot be determined by a stopwatch, but must be
145
considered in light of all the factors discussed.
In sum, the majority opinion recognized that religious
organizations have a constitutional right, grounded in both the Free
Exercise and Establishment Clauses, to be free from governmental
146
interference with their core governance functions. The Court was
careful not to elaborate on the scope of the right, nor the ministerial
exception, but for the time being said the ministerial exception clearly
applied to those in Perich’s situation.
Recognition of this
“noninterference” principle, however, clearly had ramifications
stretching well beyond the facts of this case.
C. The Alito Concurrence

Justice Samuel Alito wrote a concurrence, joined by Justice
Elena Kagan, in which he articulated a more functional approach to
the ministerial exception that focused on the actual duties of an
147
employee, rather than on the title itself. His concurrence began by
emphasizing the critical role that religious independence plays in our
constitutional structure. Characterizing the issue largely as one of
religious autonomy, he said that religious groups “must be free to
determine who is qualified to serve in positions of substantial
148
religious importance”—a point he made repeatedly.
Justice Alito then proceeded to discuss specifically the need for a
functional approach to applying the ministerial exception. Although
acknowledging that a formal title is a relevant consideration, he
149
stated it was “neither necessary nor sufficient.” He noted that most
religions do not use the term “minister” and many reject formal
150
Thus, to place too great an emphasis on formal titles
ordination.
would inevitably favor some religions over others.
Justice Alito then argued that a functional approach to the
ministerial exception, focusing on actual duties performed, was the
proper approach. He noted that this was essentially the approach

145. Id. at 709.
146. Id. at 706.
147. Id. at 711–16 (Alito, J., concurring). Justice Thomas also wrote a very short
concurrence, stressing the importance of the ministerial exception and saying that courts
should “defer to a religious organization’s good faith understanding of who qualifies as its
minister.” Id. at 710–11 (Thomas, J., concurring).
148. See id. at 712.
149. Id. at 713–14.
150. Id. at 713.
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taken by the federal circuits that had addressed the issue, none of
151
which made the existence of a title or ordination dispositive. Justice
Alito then stated that use of a functional approach in the case before
it clearly led to Perich qualifying for the ministerial exception. In
particular, he noted that Perich played a “substantial role in
conveying the Church’s message and carrying out its mission,” noting
that she taught religion to some extent, led students in daily
devotions, led students in prayer three times a day, and on occasion
152
helped with chapel services.
Although Alito acknowledged that a
purely secular teacher would not qualify for the exception, he said
153
that the teaching of some secular subjects did not disqualify Perich.
What was important was that Perich was an “instrument of her
church’s religious message” and a leader of worship activities, and
therefore “Hosanna-Tabor had the right to decide for itself whether
154
respondent was religiously qualified to remain in her office.”
In most respects Justice Alito’s concurrence is quite consistent
with the majority opinion, but it seeks to more clearly sharpen the
focus of the inquiry. The majority opinion emphasized Perich’s
religious duties and functions while giving substantial importance to
her title of “minister.” Justice Alito, however, advocated for a more
functional approach while nevertheless acknowledging that a title
might be of some relevance. Justice Alito’s concurrence focuses on
the actual duties performed and how those duties relate to the central
concerns of “conveying the Church’s message and carrying out its
155
mission,” and less on titles as such.

III. The Religion Clauses After Hosanna-Tabor
Hosanna-Tabor is an extremely significant decision, if not
necessarily a surprising one. At one level it recognized the ministerial
exception already adopted by the federal circuits—certainly an
important step in itself. But more fundamentally, and at its core,
Hosanna-Tabor recognized a realm of autonomy for religious
156
institutions free of government interference.
This autonomy
151. Id. at 714.
152. Id. at 714–15 (internal quotations omitted).
153. Id. at 715.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 714.
156. See Esbeck, supra note 13, at 10 (Hosanna-Tabor is “more than just the
ministerial exception. It is now a leading case for church autonomy, meaning internal
church decisions affecting faith or mission.” (emphasis in original)); McConnell, supra note
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includes and reaches beyond the ministerial exception, potentially
touching upon broader issues of governance, polity, and mission. As
such, it represents an important counterpoint to the emphasis on
neutrality in more recent free exercise jurisprudence.
Just as importantly, Hosanna-Tabor clearly affirmed the unique
constitutional status enjoyed by religion. The Court could not have
been clearer: Religion is not just another worldview or value system,
to be treated no better and no worse than other ideas. Instead, the
Religion Clauses establish a unique constitutional status for
157
religion, in which religion enjoys certain protections and freedom
from government interference not enjoyed by other beliefs or groups.
This is not completely new. As noted by the Court, the Watson,
Kedroff, and Milivojevich decisions had recognized a degree of
158
autonomy from government interference.
But those were more
unique circumstances, not involving generally applicable laws and
decided well before the Court’s increased focus on the neutrality
standard. In general, it is fair to say that the unique constitutional
status of religion had been lost in recent years, largely replaced by an
emphasis on equal, neutral treatment. That has not been all bad—
helping to ensure religion has a voice in the larger pubic square,
rather than being privatized and marginalized. But that came at a
cost: de-emphasizing religion’s unique status and making it vulnerable
to society’s demands.
But the Court’s decision in Hosanna-Tabor in no uncertain terms
highlights the unique status religion enjoys under the Constitution,
and in doing so places important limits on the neutrality paradigm.
The decision does not replace or overturn the neutrality standard for
most purposes; indeed, neutrality will likely continue to govern in
those contexts in which it had before. But Hosanna-Tabor makes it
clear that there are limits to the Court’s emphasis on neutrality, and
that at some point another paradigm—one of autonomy—takes over.
Part III of this article will explore the potential boundaries of
neutrality and autonomy in regulating churches. Before doing that,
however, this article will briefly look at two aspects of the Court’s
decision in Hosanna-Tabor relative to religious exercise. First, it will
examine Hosanna-Tabor’s effect on the Smith neutrality standard for
free exercise analysis. Second, it will examine how Hosanna-Tabor
13, at 835–36 (Hosanna-Tabor “suggest[s] a shift in Religion Clause jurisprudence from a
focus on individual believers to a focus on the autonomy of religious institutions.”).
157. Hosanna Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 704–05.
158. Id.
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might impact religious associational rights beyond that afforded by
the Free Speech Clause.
A. Limiting Smith

Undoubtedly, one of the most important dimensions of
Hosanna-Tabor is to limit the reach of Employment Division v.
159
The growth of antidiscrimination laws, together with the
Smith.
Smith decision, potentially put religious institutions in a precarious
160
position. Unlike the state interferences with religion addressed in
Watson, Kedroff, and Milivojevich, antidiscrimination laws are not
aimed specifically at religion and are broadly applicable. And Smith,
of course, declared that neutral, generally applicable laws do not
trigger free exercise protection. That declaration created the
possibility that the Free Exercise Clause would offer little help
against antidiscrimination laws, the Court’s prior cases
notwithstanding. Churches and other religious associations could still
assert their associational rights under the Free Speech Clause, as had
been suggested by some, but that seemed a dubious basis for
protection.
By establishing a noninterference principle, and grounding it in
the Religion Clauses, the Court made clear that Smith is not the be-all
and end-all of free exercise analysis, but only part of the picture. In
particular, Smith is altogether inapplicable when neutral and
generally applicable laws interfere with internal governance of
161
religious institutions.
In such cases the noninterference principle,
grounded in both the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses, takes
over. This is no insignificant matter since it sends a clear message
that notwithstanding Smith, free exercise protection retains some
meaningful vitality.
To be sure, Hosanna-Tabor did not negate Smith nor
significantly limit its reach. Although the boundaries between the
two decisions are yet to be fully explored, it seems apparent that
Hosanna-Tabor’s noninterference principle is limited to the internal
workings of religious institutions. For that reason, the autonomy
right recognized in Hosanna-Tabor is a corporate right and not an

159. Emp’t Div., Dept. of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
160. See McConnell, supra note 13, at 821–22 (noting tension Smith posed to “the
question of clergy hiring”).
161. See Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 707.
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162

individual one.
Indeed, in discussing the constitutional concerns
giving rise to the ministerial exception, the Court consistently used
terms such as “religious groups” and “religious organizations,” always
163
suggestive of a collective interest. Moreover, the very nature of the
right—autonomy over selection of ministers and leaders—makes
sense only in an institutional context.
Similarly, the autonomy right implicit in Hosanna-Tabor
concerns the selection of leaders relevant to the internal workings of
religious institutions, specifically as it relates to doctrine, governance,
164
and mission.
For that reason it would not apply to generally
applicable laws relating to health, safety, or land use. Although such
laws might at times burden the effectiveness of ministry and mission,
they do not affect a religious organization’s ability to define what that
mission will be. A religious organization’s right to define for itself its
beliefs, doctrine, identity and mission, all of which turn on the ability
to control leadership decisions, is the essence of the autonomy right
165
recognized in Hosanna-Tabor.
For that reason most generally
applicable laws not touching upon those core concerns would still be
subject to the Smith neutrality standard.
That Smith continues to govern the actions of individual religious
adherents, and that it will also apply to many government regulations
of religious institutions themselves, does not take away from the
significant, if only partial, way that Hosanna-Tabor limits Smith. At
their core, religious institutions are free from government
interference with their basic identity, even when such interference

162. See Note, The Ministerial Exception to Title VII: The Case for A Deferential
Primary Duties Test, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1776, 1782–83 (2008) (discussing how Smith’s
focus on free exercise rights for individuals is distinct from the ministerial exception’s
focus on “churches as institutions”). See also McConnell, supra note 13, at 836 (“Now,
however, as interpreted in Smith and Hosanna-Tabor, the Free Exercise Clause provides
for greater protection to the ‘faith and mission’ of religious institutions than to individual
acts of religious exercise.”); Corbin, supra note 13, at 955 (observing how Hosanna-Tabor,
when compared with Smith, “results in a free exercise jurisprudence that provides more
protection for religious institutions than it does for religious individuals”).
163. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 703, 705–06, 710. In discussing the constitutional
concerns giving rise to the ministerial exception, the Court consistently used terms such as
“religious organizations” and “religious groups,” strongly suggesting it is a right held in a
corporate form. Id. Also, the essence of the interest concerns a religious group’s right to
choose its ministers and leaders, which only makes sense if it is a body of believers.
164. See Laycock, supra note 13, at 856 (“The essential point is that internal church
governance is constitutionally protected and is outside the domain of Smith.”).
165. See Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 706 (emphasizing the need for a religious
organization to control its “internal governance,” which is necessary in order for it to
“shape its own faith and mission through its appointments”).
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arises from a neutral and generally applicable law. Though that
makes enormous sense, both constitutionally and otherwise, the result
was far from certain considering Smith’s rigorous neutrality emphasis.
B. Religious Associational Rights

A second significant consequence of the autonomy principle in
Hosanna-Tabor is to recognize a type of religious associational right
that is distinct from what churches, as expressive associations, are
already afforded under the Free Speech Clause. The Supreme Court
166
has long recognized a right to associate for expressive purposes,
which clearly includes religious institutions. To some degree this
potentially insulates churches from anti-discrimination laws, as it
would other expressive groups. Although the Court in Hosanna167
Tabor acknowledged the applicability of that doctrine to churches,
it also made clear that the rights afforded churches and other
religious institutions were not limited to those afforded other
168
expressive associations. Rather, the Free Exercise Clause provides
an independent and arguably more expansive associational right to
religious associations.
The right of expressive association has been recognized in a
169
variety of contexts, including as a defense to antidiscrimination
170
In the first two decisions addressing the issue, Roberts v.
laws.
171
United States Jaycees and Board of Directors v. Rotary Club of
172
Duarte, the Court held that expressive associational rights did not
insulate private clubs from antidiscrimination laws prohibiting gender
discrimination. In finding no constitutional violation in those cases,
the Court emphasized that including female members would not
appear to burden the clubs’ expressive rights, since there was no

166. See generally Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000); Roberts v. Jaycees,
468 U.S. 609 (1984); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama ex. Rel.
Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
167. See Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 700.
168. Id.
169. See, e.g., Shelton, 364 U.S. at 485 (1960) (law requiring teachers to disclose
membership in groups violates right of association); Alabama ex. rel. Patterson, 357 U.S.
at 462 (disclosing NAACP membership list violates right of association).
170. For a discussion of the right of expressive association in the context of antidiscrimination laws, see ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND
POLICIES 1160–63 (3rd ed. 2006).
171. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 627–28 (1984).
172. Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Internat’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 549
(1987).
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evidence female membership would affect positions on issues the
173
clubs might advocate.
174
The Court’s position shifted in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale,
where it held that New Jersey’s anti-discrimination law prohibiting
discrimination based on sexual orientation violated the expressive
associational rights of the Boy Scouts, which had dismissed an openly
175
gay scout leader. In finding the law unconstitutional as applied to
176
the Scouts, the Court focused on “whether the forced inclusion of
Dale as an assistant Scoutmaster would significantly affect the Boy
177
Scouts’ ability to advocate public or private viewpoints.” The Court
concluded that it would, stating that Dale’s presence as a leader
would significantly burden the Scout’s message disapproving
178
homosexual conduct, and as such, his presence interfered with the
179
Scouts’ expressive associational rights.
The Dale decision was important because it gave significant
protection to associational rights, especially in terms of membership,
which did not exist in Roberts and Duarte. The difference between
Dale and the former cases involved the perceived burden that
inclusion of Dale would have on the Scouts’ message. Even though
Dale was a 5-4 decision, all nine justices agreed that inclusion of
members inconsistent with a group’s message would violate
associational rights; the dissenters simply disagreed that any clear
180
interference had been shown in the case. As such, Dale established
a degree of institutional autonomy that would withstand anti173. See Duarte, 481 U.S. at 548–49; Roberts, 468 U.S. at 627. The Court also stated in
both cases that there was a compelling government interest in eliminating gender
discrimination sufficient to satisfy even strict scrutiny. See Duarte, 481 U.S. at 549;
Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623. Though not altogether clear, the Court in both cases appeared to
apply strict scrutiny, but also emphasized the minimal burden the challenged law placed
on associational rights.
174. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
175. Id. at 644–45.
176. Id. at 659.
177. Id. at 650.
178. Id. at 653–56.
179. Id. at 659.
180. The four dissenting Justices, in an opinion written by Justice Stevens, stated that
“[t]he relevant question is whether the mere inclusion of the person at issue would ‘impose
any serious burden,’ ‘affect in any significant way,’ or be ‘a substantial restraint upon’ the
organization’s ‘shared goals,’ ‘basic goals,’ or collective efforts to foster beliefs.” Id. at 683
(Stevens, J., dissenting). They concluded that inclusion of Dale as an assistant scoutmaster
fell far short of that standard since the Scouts had no clear set of beliefs regarding
homosexuality and any views on the subject were not part of the organization’s basic or
shared beliefs. Id. at 685.
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discrimination laws, though the Court was closely divided on what
needed to be shown to trigger that right.
The Court in Hosanna-Tabor acknowledged that churches and
other religious institutions qualify as expressive associations for the
181
type of protection recognized in Dale. The Court also made it clear
that religious associations have an additional associational right—one
grounded in the Religion Clauses—that is independent of any right
enjoyed as expressive association under the Free Speech Clause.
Characterizing the First Amendment as giving “special solicitude to
182
the rights of religious organizations,” what might be loosely labeled
“religious associational rights,” provides a degree of autonomy
beyond that provided for expressive associations.
The most obvious distinction between the expressive
associational right recognized in Dale and the religious associational
right implicitly recognized in Hosanna-Tabor is what is required to
establish an infringement. Whereas the expressive associational right
recognized in Dale is infringed when inclusion of an unwanted
183
member would “substantially burden” a group’s message, there is
no such requirement for infringing a religious associational right.
There is no need to establish a burden on the religious group’s
message or beliefs, such as applying a gender discrimination law to a
184
church that does not believe in female pastors. Instead, the right is
violated by undue interference with a religious association’s
leadership, whether it implicates beliefs or not. The defining
characteristic is not an interference with the group’s message, but
rather an intrusion into certain decisions regarding church leadership
185
and governance.
The scope of the religious associational right implicit in
Hosanna-Tabor is less clear. The Court was careful to limit its
decision to the narrow facts of the case before it, simply holding that
the Religion Clauses create a “ministerial exception” to antidiscrimination laws and that the ministerial exception applied to the
181. See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct.
694, 706 (2012).
182. See id.
183. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 659.
184. The Court in Hosanna-Tabor clearly indicated that such a showing was not
necessary. 132 S. Ct. at 706. See also Laycock, supra note 13, at 850–51 (discussing how
the ministerial exception does not turn on whether the reasons for dismissal relate to a
church’s doctrine; rather, it is grounded in a church’s right to select its ministers free of
state interference, regardless of the reasons).
185. See Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 706.
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186

particular facts of the case. The extent and reach of the ministerial
exception as to other areas of church autonomy that the
noninterference principle insulates from antidiscrimination laws were
left unexplored. The final part of this Article will examine three of
those issues.

IV. Examining the Reach of Religious Institutional Autonomy
Under Hosanna-Tabor
Central to the Court’s decision in Hosanna-Tabor was
recognition of a religious autonomy interest that insulates religious
organizations from certain interferences with their internal
governance relative to their mission. It seems relatively clear that this
is a right held by religious groups and institutions and not by
individuals. Thus, Hosanna-Tabor would not provide a basis for an
187
individual to assert autonomy rights against government regulation.
Moreover, it is clear that Hosanna-Tabor does not insulate religious
institutions from all government regulations or laws. Instead, it
focused on interferences with a religious organization’s mission and
governance posed by antidiscrimination laws.
Thus, religious
organizations remain subject to regulation on a number of levels.
The potential scope of the autonomy interest, however, remains
unclear in several important respects. The Court in Hosanna-Tabor
was intentionally cautious in discussing the scope of the right, noting
that it was the first case to recognize the right and that it was enough
188
to recognize that the exception applied to the facts before it.
In
doing so, the Court was not limiting the potential reach of the
ministerial exception itself, or commenting on the more fundamental
concerns about religious autonomy underlying the holding. The final
part of this Article will examine three issues regarding the potential
scope of the religious rights recognized in Hosanna-Tabor: (1) the
scope of the ministerial exception, both in terms of which employees
it might cover and what organizations might assert it; (2) the
application of the autonomy interest to nonemployees, such as lay
leaders and basic membership; and (3) the contexts in which the
autonomy interest might apply; specifically, when does the autonomy
paradigm end and the neutrality paradigm begin?

186.
187.
188.

Id. at 707.
See id. at 706.
See id. at 707.
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A. The Scope of the Ministerial Exception

The first and most immediate impact of Hosanna-Tabor is the
Supreme Court’s recognition of the ministerial exception previously
developed by the lower courts. As noted earlier, the importance of
the decision reaches beyond that, but recognition of the exception
itself is extremely significant. It solidifies that there are limits to what
government can do in restricting churches and other religious groups
in their decisions to hire and fire their ministerial leaders.
1.

What Organizations are Covered?

Before examining which employees the ministerial exception
might cover, the inquiry begins with what organizations can qualify
for the ministerial exception to be exempt from antidiscrimination
laws. The Court in Hosanna-Tabor did not discuss the issue as such,
assuming that the church in question would qualify if the Court
recognized such an exception under the First Amendment. This is
not surprising since churches and other houses of worship would
logically be the quintessential example of institutions with such an
autonomy interest. Not only is there strong historical support for the
principle that government should not interfere with the internal
189
appointments of churches, but houses of worship also represent the
core practice of most faiths. It is there, more than anywhere else, that
the associational dimensions of faith are experienced, and where
mission and doctrine are practiced. The title and functions of
ministers are also more closely aligned with, and exercised in, the
context of churches and other houses of worship.
That being said, there are several aspects of Hosanna-Tabor that
suggest a broader view of what religious institutions might qualify for
the exception. First, although the school at which Perich taught was
operated by and under the control of a traditional church and
190
considered part of its ministry, the actual context of the dispute, a
school, fell outside the confines of a traditional church. The facts
reflect that the exception can be asserted outside the limited confines
of traditional church structures and activities.
Second, and more important, was the Court’s careful use of
language throughout the opinion, referring to the religious bodies
that might assert the exception as “religious groups” and “religious

189. See id. at 702–04 (discussing strong historical support for government not
interfering with ministerial appointments of churches).
190. Id.
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191

organizations.”
Not too much should be made of this since the
Court was likely being careful, considering the diversity of religion in
America and the terms used to describe even more traditional
religious functions. Yet, it is significant since the language reflects the
reality that religious missions occur in various organizational settings,
many of which do not include worship and traditional ministerial
duties. Such “groups” and “organizations” seem to be among the
type of religious bodies that the Religion Clauses were designed to
protect.
The core institutional concerns at the heart of Hosanna-Tabor
are often exercised by various religious groups and organizations.
These include what are commonly called “parachurch” ministries, as
well as various religious schools, missions, and charitable service
192
organizations. In common among these ministries is that each has a
sense of religious mission, seeking to practice their faith. Such
organizations frequently have doctrine and faith statements that
193
define their religious identity and mission.
While not necessarily
practicing religious rites, these organizations are a vibrant part of the
American landscape and, more importantly, an indispensable vehicle
for many religious adherents to live out their faith in a corporate
form. Thus, the same concerns at the heart of the autonomy right
recognized in Hosanna-Tabor—that a religious body has control, free
of state interference, over its doctrine, mission, and governance—
apply equally to such religious organizations.
It is not surprising, then, that lower courts have applied the
ministerial exception to religious organizations beyond churches and
other traditional places of worship. This has included organizations

191. See, e.g., id. at 705 (“We have not had occasion to consider whether this freedom
of a religious organization to select its ministers is implicated by a suit alleging
discrimination in employment.”); id. at 706 (“By imposing an unwanted minister, the state
infringes the Free Exercise Clause, which protects a religious group’s right to shape its
own faith and mission through its appointments.”); id. at 710 (“The interest of religious
groups in choosing who will preach their beliefs, teach their faith, and carry out their
mission” is “undoubtedly important.”).
192. See MARK A. NOLL, A HISTORY OF CHRISTIANITY IN THE UNITED STATES AND
CANADA 534–35 (1992) (discussing significant growth of independent mission boards,
without denominational affiliation, in the second half of the twentieth century).
193. For example, Intervarsity Christian Fellowship, a large non-church-affiliated
religious organization that has ministries on college campuses across the country, has a
doctrinal statement of faith. See DOCTRINAL STATEMENT OF FAITH OF INTERVARSITY
CHRISTIAN FELLOWSHIP, http://www.intervarsity.org/about/our/our-doctrinal-basis (last
visited Nov. 20, 2013).
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195

such as the Salvation Army, universities, a religiously affiliated
196
197
198
In
nursing home, religious secondary schools, and hospitals.
doing so, courts have found that the exception applies whenever an
institution’s “mission is marked by clear or obvious religious
199
characteristics.” In applying the exception in this way, courts have
recognized the inherently religious mission of such groups and
assumed that the ministerial exception applied to the same extent as
to churches and denominational hierarchies. For the exception to
apply, the employee in question must come within the reach of the
exception, which is discussed next.
2.

What Employees are Covered?

The second issue regarding the scope of the ministerial
exception, and really the crux of the issue, is determining which
employees should come within its reach. The Court in HosannaTabor was reluctant to set out the full parameters of when the
exception would apply. The Court noted the exception “is not limited
200
to the head of a religious congregation,” but it did not want to set
out a clear test for when it applies. As the Court addressed the
parameters of the exception for the first time in Hosanna-Tabor, it
indicated it was enough to hold that the exception applied under the
201
circumstances of the case.
In that respect, the Court noted that
Perich had the title of minister and held herself out as such, had a
202
type of ordination, and engaged in various religious responsibilities.
The Court did not state whether the exception would apply to those
without formal titles or ordination, those with less expansive religious
duties, and the like. Those questions could be addressed, if necessary,
in subsequent decisions.

194. McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972).
195. EEOC v. Catholic Univs. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 464–65 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
196. Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew Home of Greater Wash., Inc., 363 F.3d 299 (4th Cir.
2004).
197. EEOC v. Freemont Christian Sch., 781 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1986); Geary v.
Visitation of the Blessed Mary Parish Sch., 7 F.3d 324 (3d Cir. 1993).
198. Hollins v. Methodist Healthcare, Inc., 474 F.3d 223 (6th Cir. 2007); Scharon v. St.
Luke’s Episcopal Hosp., 929 F.2d 360 (8th Cir. 1991).
199. See Shaliehsabou, 363 F.3d at 310; Hollins, 474 F.3d at 225–26.
200. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694,
707 (2012).
201. See id.
202. See id. at 707–08.
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Though declining to elaborate on the complete reach of the
ministerial exception, the Court did identify the rationales supporting
the decision. The most fundamental rationale is the Constitution’s
special charge to protect religious freedom and to avoid government
entanglement in religious affairs. Much of the Court’s discussion in
that regard focused on historical concerns about the government
203
filling ecclesiastical offices or appointing ministers. Thus, Madison’s
refusal to appoint bishops reflected his view that government has no
204
right or interest in appointing or removing members of the clergy.
In couching most of its language in terms of a religious group’s
ability to appoint its own ministers, the Court also identified concerns
in interfering with that right. In particular, the Court emphasized that
by appointing ministers, government interfered with a religious
institution’s right to self-governance and the institution’s ability to
shape its own faith and mission. As stated by the Court, government
interference with the appointment and removal of a minister:
[I]ntrudes on more than a mere employment
decision. Such action interferes with the internal
governance of the church, depriving it of control over
the selection of those who will personify its beliefs. By
imposing an unwanted minister, the state infringes the
Free Exercise Clause, which protects a religious
group’s right to shape its own faith and mission
205
through its appointments.
Thus, the underlying concern with the ministerial exception is
not interference with employment decisions per se, but interference
with a religious institution’s ability to shape its faith and mission.
The federal circuits and other courts had identified these same
concerns in applying the ministerial exception. For example, in
McClure v. Salvation Army, the first case to recognize a ministerial
exception, the Fifth Circuit stated that the exception was necessary to
ensure that religious organizations could decide for themselves, “free
from state interference, matters of church government as well as
206
those of faith and doctrine.”
203. Id. at 703.
204. Id. at 703–04.
205. Id. at 706.
206. McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 560 (5th Cir. 1972) (quoting Kedroff v.
St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church, 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952)).
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Therefore, it is not surprising that most lower courts have
applied some type of functional test to determine the scope of the
207
ministerial exception.
Although some circuits initially seemed to
208
limit the exception to formal ministers, eventually almost all circuits
expanded the exception to other employees who, though not formal
ministers, nevertheless were involved in ministerial-like duties. In
extending the ministerial exception, some courts have applied a
“primary duties” test to examine whether the employee’s duties are
“important to the spiritual mission” of the church or if the primary
duties involve spreading faith, teaching, or participation in ritual and
209
worship. Using this functional approach, lower courts have applied
the ministerial exception to a number of positions, including religious
210
schoolteachers, youth leaders, music directors, and organists.
Justice Alito’s concurrence in Hosanna-Tabor, joined by Justice
Kagan, picked up on this concern. He noted that many religions and
religious bodies do not use formal ministers and do not require a
process of ordination, and thus, too much of a focus on the term
“minister” is under-inclusive and fails to fulfill the designs of the First
211
Amendment.
He argued that the Court should instead follow the
“functional” analysis used by lower courts, focusing “on the function
performed by persons who work for religious bodies.” As stated by
Justice Alito:

207. See, e.g., Hollins v. Methodist Healthcare, Inc., 474 F.3d 223, 226 (6th Cir. 2007);
Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew Home of Greater Wash. Inc., 363 F.3d 299,307 (4th Cir. 2004);
Alicea-Hernandez v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 320 F.3d 698, 703 (7th Cir. 2003); Starkman
v. Evans, 198 F.3d 173, 175–76 (5th Cir. 1999); Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh
Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1168 (4th Cir. 1985).
208. See Hollins, 474 F.2d at 226 (stating that prior to that decision the Sixth Circuit
had only applied the ministerial exception to ordained ministers).
209. See, e.g., Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1169. A few courts have used a three-part test to
assess these concerns, weighing (1) whether employment decisions are largely made on
religious criteria; (2) whether the employee was authorized to perform ceremonies of the
church; and (3) whether the employee engaged in activities traditionally considered
ecclesiastical or religious. See Starkman, 198 F.2d at 176–77.
210. See EEOC v. Catholic Univers. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 464–65 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(Catholic nun teaching Canon law); Weishuhn v. Catholic Diocese of Lansing, 756 N.W.2d
483 (Mich. App. 2008) (teacher at Catholic school); Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria,
442 F.3d 1036, 1037 (7th Cir. 2006) (church music director and organist); Miller v. Bay
View United Methodist Church, Inc., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1174, 1181–82 (E.D. Wis., 2001)
(church music and choir director); Starkman, 198 F.3d at 174 (church choir director);
Shaliehsabou, 363 F.3d at 309 (Kosher supervisor for religious institution); AliceaHernandez, 320 F.3d at 703 (communications director for Archdiocese of Chicago).
211. See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct.
694, 711 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring).
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The First Amendment protects the freedom of
religious groups to engage in certain key religious
activities, including the conducting of worship services
and other religious ceremonies and rituals, as well as
the critical process of communicating the faith . . . .
The “ministerial” exception should be tailored to this
purpose. It should apply to any “employee” who leads
a religious organization, conducts worship services or
important religious ceremonies or rituals, or serves as
212
a messenger or teacher of its faith.
As the Court proceeds to refine the ministerial exemption, it
makes sense to focus on employee functions, and not titles, as
advocated by Justice Alito and adopted by most lower courts. There
are two basic reasons for doing this. First, as suggested by Justice
Alito, a focus on titles fails to recognize that many religious traditions
do not have ministers or formal leaders, nor do many traditions have
213
ordination or a comparable process for leaders.
Too great an
emphasis on formal titles potentially discriminates among religions,
and most likely against less traditional religions.
Second, and just as important, a focus on function better
addresses the basic concerns giving rise to the ministerial exception in
the first place: religious autonomy in the area of faith, doctrine, and
mission. To be sure, those with the title of minister are likely to be
integrally involved with such matters, and at a minimum, the First
Amendment should require that religious institutions be free from
government interference in the hiring and firing of such employees.
Issues of faith, doctrine, and mission hardly end there, however, since
other employees are often integrally involved with such matters.
Thus, protection of religious autonomy with regard to faith, doctrine
and mission needs more flexibility than a focus on titles alone would
bring.
As a practical matter, a functional approach is consistent with the
majority’s own analysis. Although the majority emphasized Perich’s
title of minister and the special training she received, it also
emphasized the religious nature of many of Perich’s duties that would
214
be the focus of a functional analysis.
Moreover, by its own
212. Id. at 711–12.
213. Id. at 711.
214. Id. at 708 (majority opinion) (emphasizing that “Perich’s job duties reflected a
role in conveying the Church’s message and carrying out its mission”).
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admission, the majority was deliberately cautious in Hosanna-Tabor,
215
Thus, a
wanting to only resolve the issue on the facts before it.
focus on duties rather than titles would not require a change so much
as a refinement, and would be consistent with the underlying
concerns voiced by the majority.
The one area, however, in which the majority’s analysis appears
to diverge from that of the lower courts’ is with regard to what
proportion of the duties must relate to a church’s religious mission
and beliefs, and how much may be secular. Although most lower
circuits focus on function and not merely title, the majority of them
require that the primary duties be religious and ministerial, and not
just a limited component of the job. Indeed, many courts described
the analysis as the “primary duties test,” requiring that the religious
duties be the primary or principal component of what the employee
216
did. It was on that basis that the Sixth Circuit held that Perich did
not qualify for the “ministerial exception,” stating that the religious
dimensions of her job—occasionally teaching religion, leading
devotions in the morning, and planning and leading chapel services
217
twice a year—were too small in comparison to her secular duties.
The Supreme Court rejected that analysis, saying the issue “is
218
not one that can be resolved by a stopwatch.” The Court did not
wholly discount the concern, stating that “[t]he amount of time an
employee spends on particular activities is relevant in assessing an
employee’s status, but that factor alone cannot be considered in
isolation, without regard to the nature of the religious functions
219
performed and the other considerations discussed above.”
This suggests that the majority’s opinion was not a complete
rejection of the primary duties test, but a finessing of it. At a
minimum, it stands for the proposition that where an employee has
the title of minister with formal training and exams involved, then the
amount of time need not be primary. On the other hand, the absence
of titles and ordination might require a greater proportion of time
being dedicated to religious responsibilities rather than secular. In
215. Id. at 707.
216. See Shaliehsabo v. Hebrew Home of Greater Wash. Inc., 363 F.3d 299, 307 (4th
Cir. 2009); Starkman v. Evans, 198 F.3d 173, 176 (5th Cir. 1999); EEOC v. Catholic Univ.
of America, 83 F.3d 455, 463 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of SeventhDay Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1168 (4th Cir. 1985).
217. See EEOC v. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch., 597 F.3d 769,
778–81 (6th Cir. 2010).
218. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 709.
219. Id.
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any event, the majority opinion is clear that the ministerial exception
does not necessarily require that religious responsibilities be primary
in all instances. In that regard, the majority opinion can be seen as an
important expansion of the ministerial exception beyond that
220
recognized in the lower courts.
B. Extending the Exception to Governance and Membership

The ministerial exception, both in the lower courts and as
recognized in Hosanna-Tabor, concerns discrimination complaints
raised by employees. In federal court, the exception is typically
raised in the context of a Title VII employment discrimination claim.
It is not surprising, therefore, that the Court’s analysis was couched in
the context of discrimination regarding employees, and the
221
ministerial exception itself was predicated on an employment status.
A separate issue raised by Hosanna-Tabor is the extent to which
the noninterference principle established in Hosanna-Tabor also
applies to discrimination claims raised by members, but not
employees, of a religious institution. While such claims would not
come under Title VII and comparable state legislation, they could
conceivably fall under a state public accommodation legislation
prohibiting discrimination in public accommodations. In some states,
this has been construed to include membership in clubs and civic
associations. The Supreme Court has decided four cases addressing
whether such membership discrimination claims under state law
violates free speech associational rights. In three of the cases the
Court held that the First Amendment did not insulate the groups
222
from charges of discrimination, while in the fourth case, Boy Scouts

220. For criticisms of the lower court “primary duties” test, arguing that it does not
sufficiently protect religious freedom, see Lund, supra note 101, at 65–71; Lauren N.
Woleslagle, Comment, The United States Supreme Court Sanctifies the Ministerial
Exception in Hosanna-Tabor v. EEOC without Addressing Who is a Minister: A Blessing
for Religious Freedom or is the Line Between Church and State Still Blurred?, 50 DUQ. L.
REV. 895, 913–15 (2012).
221. See, e.g., Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 699 (“[c]ertain employment discrimination
laws authorize employees who have been wrongfully terminated to sue their employers for
reinstatement and damages. The question presented is whether the Establishment and
Free Exercise clauses of the First Amendment bar such action when the employer is a
religious group and the employee is one of the group’s ministers.”).
222. N.Y. State Club Ass’n, Inc. v. City of N.Y., 487 U.S. 1 (1988); Bd. of Dirs. of
Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537 (1987); Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468
U.S. 609 (1984).
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of America v. Dale, the Court stated that the application of the state
223
statute would violate the right of association.
Religious institutions frequently discriminate in terms of
membership and leadership. However, there have yet to be any cases
brought against them for such discrimination and little reason to
believe that there will be any in the foreseeable future. Part of this is
that few people want to be part of a church or other religious
fellowship that would not want them. Additionally, there is likely a
special sensitivity to bringing such claims against a religious group.
Nonetheless, it makes sense to briefly explore the extent to
which the noninterference principle protects religious institutions in
such situations, since there is certainly the possibility of such claims in
224
the future.
Although claims of discrimination by non-employed
members of an institution might arise in a variety of situations, there
are three principal ones that should be examined. First, situations of
governance involving lay leaders of a congregation, such as members
of a church board or elders. Second, situations involving lay leaders
of church programming, such as leaders of a particular ministry. This
might include youth work or Sunday school, or a service project, such
as working with the homeless. Third, situations involving church
membership, which often has some minimal requirements.
1.

Lay Leaders

It seems clear that the basic concerns of autonomy for religious
institutions at the core of Hosanna-Tabor should apply to some
degree to lay leaders. As stated by the Court in Hosanna-Tabor, the
225
ministerial exception goes beyond “mere employment decision[s],”
but concerns the right of religious institutions “to shape [their] own
faith and mission.” While ministers and comparable employee
positions are integral to shaping a religious institution’s faith and
mission, many, if not most, religions have lay people who are also
integrally involved in shaping the institution’s faith and mission.
Protestant churches, for example, typically have elders or church
boards who oversee the church and have duties that include
establishing policy, establishing mission, and setting ministry
priorities.

223. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 659 (2000).
224. See Lund, supra note 101, at 25–27 (discussing the increasing insensitivity of state
and local anti-discrimination laws to religious concerns in the employment context).
225. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 706.
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Similarly, lay people are often engaged in the work of ministry of
the type that lower courts have found sufficient to qualify for the
ministerial exception as employees.
This would include
communicating the faith in settings as a teacher, youth leader, or
adult education leader, participating in music, and participating in or
leading service activities. These forms of lay leadership and service
are expressions of religious organizations’ beliefs and doctrines, and
are integral to both defining and fulfilling the organizations’ mission.
In the words of Justice Alito, such people clearly serve as
226
“messenger[s] or teacher[s] of [the] faith.”
Therefore, a strong argument can be made that lay leaders of
religious organizations, both those with governance authority and
those with ministry authority, should come within the autonomy
interest recognized in Hosanna-Tabor. Such people are integral to
defining and carrying out a religious institution’s faith, doctrine, and
mission. As stated by the Court in Kedroff, the First Amendment
guarantees religious institutions “independence from secular control
and manipulation, in short, power to decide for themselves free from
state interference, matters of church government as well as . . . faith
227
and doctrine.”
If that is truly the case, then religious institutions
must be insulated from antidiscrimination mandates when appointing
lay leaders.
2.

Organizational Membership

Finally, the autonomy interest inherent in Hosanna-Tabor should
also extend to organizational membership itself, apart from any
leadership or governance responsibilities a person might have. To the
extent that discrimination in membership concerns religious beliefs,
such as professing certain tenets of faith, churches and other religious
institutions would appear to be protected by the expressive
associational right recognized in Dale. As noted earlier, that right is
infringed when the inclusion of an unwanted member “affects in a
significant way the group’s ability to advocate public or private
228
viewpoints.” That would be the case if religious organizations were
required to admit members who did not profess the organization’s
essential religious beliefs. The very identity of the group would
thereby be threatened.
226. Id. at 712 (Alito, J., concurring).
227. Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church, 344 U.S. 94, 116
(1952).
228. Dale, 530 U.S. at 648.
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But the religious associational right implicit in Hosanna-Tabor
goes further than the expressive associational right of Dale and does
not require that the inclusion of an unwanted person be contrary to
the organization’s message. Rather, the exception grounded in the
Religion Clauses concerns the religious group’s autonomy itself,
recognizing an area in which government cannot intrude. Thus, in
Hosanna-Tabor it was irrelevant whether the church had beliefs
229
about the underlying basis for the lawsuit: disability status. Once it
was established that Perich qualified for the exception, it was
sufficient to insulate the church from any charges of discrimination,
whether they implicated the church’s tenets of faith or not.
There are several reasons the autonomy interest in HosannaTabor should also extend to membership issues, insulating religious
organizations from any nondiscrimination mandate. Most basic is the
recognition that the Religion Clauses establish a special sphere for
religious organizations in which they are immune from certain types
of government interference regarding faith and mission. The Court in
Hosanna-Tabor stated that the Free Exercise Clause “protects a
religious group’s right to shape its own faith and mission through its
appointments” and the Establishment Clause prohibits the state from
230
deciding “which individuals will minister to the faithful.”
A
religious group shapes its “faith and mission” not just through
appointment of leaders, but also in deciding who will be its members.
Similarly, if the state cannot decide who “will minister to the
faithful,” neither should it be able to decide who will constitute “the
faithful,” which is essentially the question of membership. Indeed,
the final analysis of who can be a member of a religious group is every
bit as important in shaping the group’s identity as is the question of
who will minister to the group.
There are also two pragmatic reasons why membership issues
should fall within the autonomy interest recognized in HosannaTabor. First is the reality that membership often determines who the
229. See Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 706. It should be noted that although there was
initially a possible (though unclear) discrimination claim based on disability status, the
actual EEOC lawsuit alleged that Perich was terminated because she threatened to file a
lawsuit. See id. at 701. Also, the Hosanna-Tabor church asserted that Perich was not
terminated because of her disability, but because she threatened litigation, which violated
tenets of the church’s religion. Id. Thus, from its perspective the termination did relate to
its religious beliefs. It is clear from the Court’s analysis in Hosanna-Tabor, however, that
there is an autonomy interest that insulates religious organizations form interference with
their personnel decisions, whether those decisions are based on the group’s tenets of faith
or not. See Laycock, supra note 13, at 845, 850–51 (discussing this aspect of the case).
230. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 706.
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ministers will be, the ultimate concern in Hosanna-Tabor. Although
practices vary within religious traditions, the appointment of
ministers and other leaders is often left in the hands of local
congregations. Failure to control the membership composition might
lead to failure to control the ministers.
The second pragmatic reason to extend the religious
associational rights of Hosanna-Tabor to membership issues rather
than rely on the expressive associational rights recognized in Dale is
the precarious nature of the Dale holding. All nine Justices in Dale
recognized that the right of expressive association protects against
some unwanted members, but the justices disagreed on what triggers
231
that right. The five-Justice majority was deferential to the Scouts in
defining what their views were and what would constitute a burden
232
However, the four dissenting justices were more
on those views.
probing and would limit the right to exclude members only to those
instances where such inclusion would truly undercut the group’s
233
identity.
In the three previous cases involving expressive
associational rights, the Court held that forced inclusion of an
234
unwanted member would not violate the right. Even a slight change
in the Court’s composition could make assertion of expressive
associational rights far more difficult than it was in Dale, making the
Religion Clauses a much more secure basis for churches and religious
organizations to control their membership.
C. When Does the Right Apply?: Examining the Boundaries of
Autonomy and Neutrality

The two previous subsections have argued that the core
autonomy interest recognized in Hosanna-Tabor, which was
predicated on concerns for control over a religious organization’s
faith, doctrine, and mission, should be read expansively in three ways.
First, the ministerial exception should apply not just to those
employees holding the formal title of minister, but should also apply
to any employee with substantial duties relevant to the doctrine and

231. See supra note 181.
232. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 650–56.
233. See id. at 683–85 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
234. See generally N.Y. State Club Ass’n v. City of N.Y., 487 U.S. 1 (1988); Bd. of
Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537 (1987); Roberts v. United States Jaycees,
468 U.S. 609 (1984).

346

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 41:2
235

mission of the church, a position adopted by lower courts and
236
Second, the exception
advocated in Justice Alito’s concurrence.
should apply not only to traditional churches and houses of worship,
but also to any religious organization whose primary focus is religious
237
in nature. Third, the autonomy values giving rise to the ministerial
exception also suggest that religious organizations, such as churches,
should have the same right to control its lay leaders and members.
A final issue is: Under what circumstances may a religious
organization assert the autonomy interest at the core of HosannaTabor. As occurred in Hosanna-Tabor, if government seeks to
compel a religious institution to comply with antidiscrimination laws
in a way that interferes with the institution’s governance and mission,
then the ministerial exception should apply. In such a situation, the
mere existence of the religious institution exposes it to government
interference with its governance and mission. The Religion Clauses
mean that religious institutions, and especially church bodies, should
be able to exist free from government interference with the
238
institution’s integral governance, doctrine, and mission.
A different situation occurs, however, if a religious organization
seeks access to a government forum and fails to conform to antidiscrimination requirements. In such a situation, government is not
seeking to interfere per se with a religious group’s internal affairs, but
is simply setting terms for groups that wish to participate in a
government program or forum. As such, the group can choose not to
participate in the forum and be insulated from antidiscrimination
requirements, or comply with such requirements and participate in
the forum. Or, as might often be the case, remain insulated from
antidiscrimination requirements for most purposes, but modify its
standards for others.
Whatever the case, the application of
antidiscrimination laws for purposes of a forum or program would not
be as problematic as it is when applying laws merely because of the
religious group’s existence.
This distinction between government interference with matters
integral to a religious organization’s governance, doctrine, and

235. See, e.g., Hollins v. Methodist Healthcare, Inc., 474 F.3d 223, 226 (6th Cir. 2007);
Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1168–69 (4th Cir.
1985); Starkman v. Evans, 198 F.3d 173, 175 (6th Cir. 1999).
236. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 711–12 (Alito, J., concurring).
237. See Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew Home of Greater Wash., Inc., 363 F.3d 299, 310 (4th
Cir. 2004).
238. See Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 706.
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mission on the one hand, and that same organization seeking access
to a government forum on the other hand, is seen by contrasting
Hosanna-Tabor with the Court’s decision in Christian Legal Society v.
239
Martinez, decided two years earlier. Both decisions involved
application of antidiscrimination provisions to a religious group, with
the First Amendment insulating the religious organization in
Hosanna-Tabor, but not protecting the group in Christian Legal
Society. Although the Christian Legal Society organization in
Christian Legal Society enjoys the autonomy interest recognized in
Hosanna-Tabor, the differing results turn on the context in which the
anti-discrimination provisions are applied. This section will first
discuss the Christian Legal Society decision, and then contrast it with
Hosanna-Tabor to better understand the boundaries between the
autonomy and neutrality paradigms.
1.

Christian Legal Society v. Martinez

Although a strong argument can be made that religious
autonomy interests should insulate any religious group from antidiscrimination requirements, the Supreme Court rejected that
argument in favor of the neutrality paradigm in Christian Legal
240
Society v. Martinez. That case involved a policy of the University of
California, Hastings College of the Law requiring recognized student
groups not to discriminate on any basis in their membership and
241
leadership eligibility. The Christian Legal Society (“CLS”), which
required that its members and leaders accept certain core beliefs
about religion and sexual orientation, sought an exemption from the
policy; it was denied. CLS sued claiming that the policy violated its
“rights to free speech, expressive association, and free exercise of
242
religion.”
The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, rejected the organization’s
243
arguments and held Hastings’ policy to be constitutional.
The

239. Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal. v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971
(2010).
240. Id. at 2991–92.
241. Id. at 2979–80. The Court characterized the University of California, Hastings
College of the Law policy as an “all-comers” policy, meaning that any “school-approved
groups must ‘allow any student to participate, become a member, or seek leadership
positions in the organization, regardless of [her] status or beliefs.’”
242. Id. at 2980–81.
243. Id. at 2982, 2995. For a discussion of the Christian Legal Society case, see Alan
Brownstein & Vikram Amar, Reviewing Associational Freedom Claims in a Limited Public
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Court began its constitutional analysis by identifying the limitedpublic-forum cases as the correct analytical framework, not the
244
expressive association cases.
In doing so, the Court noted that
unlike the expressive association cases where private groups were
required to include unwanted members, in this instance there was
only modest pressure to do so. The Court stated:
[T]his case fits comfortably within the limitedpublic-forum category, for CLS, in seeking what is
effectively a state subsidy, faces only indirect pressure
to modify its membership policies; CLS may exclude
any person for any reason if it forgoes the benefits of
official recognition.
The expressive-association
precedents on which CLS relies, in contrast, involved
regulations that compelled a group to include
245
unwanted members, with no choice to opt out.
For that reason, the Court stated it would use what it labeled
“the less-restrictive limited-public-forum cases” in characterizing the
Hastings policy as “dangling the carrot of subsidy, not wielding the
246
stick of prohibition.”
The Court then analyzed whether Hastings’ nondiscrimination
policy met the constitutional requirements for a limited-public-forum,
concluding that it was both reasonable and viewpoint neutral. With
regard to the reasonableness requirement, the Court noted that the
policy furthered a number of important school policies, such as
ensuring that the benefits of extracurricular activities are available to
247
all students and encouraging tolerance and cooperation.
Importantly, the Court also emphasized that the antidiscrimination
policy imposed a minimal burden on CLS, leaving the group a
248
number of alternatives for its expressive activities within the school.
In particular, the school still allowed CLS to use school facilities for
meetings and could use bulletin boards to advertise events. As a

Forum: An Extension of the Distinction Between Debate-Dampening and DebateDistorting State Action, 38 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 505 (2011).
244. Id. at 2985.
245. Id. at 2986 (emphasis in original).
246. Id.
247. Id. at 2989–90.
248. Id. at 2990.
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practical matter, the group could effectively function without official
249
recognition, a point that the Court thought was significant.
The most significant factor in limited-public-forum analysis is the
requirement that any restrictions be viewpoint neutral; the Court
found it was met. In doing so, the Court emphasized that CLS had
stipulated that Hastings had an “all-comers” policy regarding student
groups, specifically agreeing that the school “requires that registered
student organizations allow any student to participate, become a
member, or seek leadership positions in the organization, regardless
250
of [her] status or belief.”
Thus, unlike previous limited-publicforum cases, such as Widmar and Rosenberger where religious
viewpoints were excluded, in this case the Court stated that the forum
was viewpoint neutral because it treated religious speech the same as
251
all other speech. Indeed, as noted by the Court, CLS did not seek
“parity with other organizations, but a preferential exemption from
252
Hastings’ policy.”
For all practical purposes, the Court’s decision to apply the
neutrality paradigm, instead of an associational-rights focus, decided
the case. As noted, that was largely based on the perception that the
Hastings nondiscrimination policy did not compel CLS to include
unwanted members, but simply conditioned a subsidy upon such
253
inclusion.
The group was free to opt out, which left them with
substantial avenues of expression, including at the school itself. And
the Court almost completely ignored any Free Exercise Clause claim,
relegating it to a one-paragraph footnote stating that under Smith,
neutral and generally applicable regulations—which the Hastings
254
policy was—did not trigger free exercise protection.
Even the four dissenting justices gave scant attention to potential
associational rights, arguing instead that the Hastings policy was not
255
neutral but, in fact, discriminated against certain viewpoints.
The
dissent did briefly note that prohibiting religious groups from
249. Id. at 2991–92.
250. Id. at 2982. Both CLS and the dissent argued that the law school policy as
applied discriminated on several speech grounds, including certain views on religion and
sexual orientation. See id. at 3001–06 (Alito, J., dissenting). But the Court emphasized
that CLS had stipulated to the policy, thus rejecting the dissents arguments. Id. at 2982–
84.
251. Id. at 2993.
252. Id. at 2978.
253. Id. at 2986.
254. Id. at 2995 n.27.
255. Id. at 3001–06 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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discriminating on the basis of religious beliefs would interfere with
the group’s expressive associational rights under Dale since inclusion
of those with different beliefs “would ‘affect in a significant way the
256
group’s ability to advocate public or private viewpoints.’” Nowhere
in the opinion, however, did the dissent suggest that the group’s free
exercise rights, associational or otherwise, were in any way violated.
Indeed, the dissent failed to mention the Free Exercise Clause at all.
Thus, notwithstanding the substantial disagreement among the
justices over how the neutrality paradigm should be applied under the
facts, none of the nine Justices thought there was a serious free
exercise issue. Further, none of the Justices suggested any type of
religious autonomy or associational right that might be implicated
under the Religion Clauses. Yet, less than two years later, a
unanimous Court in Hosanna-Tabor found an autonomy free exercise
257
right was violated by a nondiscrimination requirement.
For that
reason it is fair to assume that the religious autonomy interest
recognized in Hosanna-Tabor is inapplicable in contexts like
Christian Legal Society, notwithstanding the fact that inclusion of
unwanted members to the CLS group involved in Christian Legal
Society would profoundly affect the nature of the group and its
mission. The next subsection will explore further how the different
contexts of the two cases help determine the boundary between the
neutrality and autonomy paradigms.
2.

Establishing the Boundary Between Neutrality and Autonomy

In its most basic sense, Hosanna-Tabor involved the “ministerial
exception” for employment discrimination claims under Title VII,
while Christian Legal Society involved membership and leadership in
a volunteer group. Yet, as is argued in previous sections, the core
reasoning of Hosanna-Tabor should extend beyond its immediate
facts and beyond employment decisions to include membership and
leadership positions that implicate governance, doctrine, and mission.
For that reason the national board and officers of the Christian Legal
Society and its membership should be protected by the autonomy
258
interest recognized in Hosanna-Tabor.
256. Id. at 3012 (quoting Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648).
257. See Ashutosh A. Bhagwat, Book Review, Assembly Resurrected, 92 TEX. L. REV.
351, 370–73 (2012) (discussing contrasting results in Christian Legal Society and HosannaTabor, suggesting the difference was that one was treated as an associational/free speech
case and the other as a religion case).
258. The CLS organization clearly qualifies as the type of religious organization
protected under Hosanna-Tabor. The Christian Legal Society homepage on its website
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The distinction between the two cases turns not on the nature of
the organization, but on the context in which the interference
259
occurs.
In this regard, the distinction drawn in Christian Legal
Society on why the associational rights recognized in Dale did not
apply is instructive. In declining to scrutinize Hastings’ policy in
terms of associational policy, the Court in Christian Legal Society
emphasized two factors. First, and most important, the Court noted
that whereas the law in Dale compelled the Boy Scouts to comply—it
had no choice—in Christian Legal Society the group could opt out of
the limited-forum and yet still continue to function relatively well as a
group, though it would forgo some of the benefits provided by a
260
limited-public forum. In other words, the mere existence of the Boy
Scouts subjected them to a forced inclusion of unwanted members,
whereas CLS was subjected to the nondiscrimination policy only after
seeking access to the limited-public-forum.
A second factor, emphasized by the Court in Christian Legal
Society as part of its limited-public-forum analysis, was the adequacy
of alternatives available to CLS and the limited burden the all-comers
policy actually placed on them. According to the Court, the actual
burden was modest at best, with CLS remaining able to use rooms for
261
meetings and various forms of communication. As such, CLS could
opt out of the limited-public-forum, but still pursue its basic mission.
This reaffirmed the first factor, that the actual burden was not that
great.
Although the Court’s analysis in Christian Legal Society was in
the context of expressive associational rights, the application of those
factors also seems relevant in determining when a state interferes
states: “CLS is a membership organization of Christian attorneys, judges, paralegals, law
students, and other legal professionals dedicated to serving Jesus Christ through the
practice of law, defense of religious freedom, and provision of legal aid to the needy.” Its
Mission Statement provides: “The mission of the Christian Legal Society is to inspire,
encourage, and equip Christian lawyers and law students both individually and in
community to proclaim, love and serve Jesus Christ through the study and practice of law,
the provision of legal assistance to the poor and needy, and the defense of inalienable
rights to life and religious freedom.” See CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOCIETY, http://www.clsnet.
org/ (last visited Oct. 25, 2013).
259. For an insightful discussion about the clash in outcomes between Christian Legal
Society and Hosanna-Tabor, see Esbeck, supra note 13. Esbeck argues that the common
thread between the two cases is that they “share a narrow definition of religion,” and that
they “harmonize around an understanding that religion is fully protected only when
exercised in private.” Id. at 3.
260. Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal. v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971,
2986 (2010).
261. Id. at 2990–92.
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with the type of autonomy interest recognized in Hosanna-Tabor.
The starting point of analysis is that the autonomy principle gives
religious institutions complete control in selecting and retaining its
ministers, leaders, and members. In other words, personnel decisions
that impact the organization’s faith, doctrine, and mission are
sacrosanct—government has no right to interfere in that core
function.
In determining whether that right is violated, however, the
inquiry should be in the degree of coercion antidiscrimination laws
262
puts on a religious organization to give up that right of control.
That, in essence, is what the two factors from Christian Legal Society
focus on. To the extent that a law requires a religious organization to
comply with antidiscrimination mandates—as was the case in
Hosanna-Tabor—the coercion is total and the law is clearly
unconstitutional. In contrast, there is little coercion in situations like
Christian Legal Society for a group that can abandon its autonomy
over personnel decisions since the group can opt out of the limited
263
forum and still effectively pursue its mission.
Focusing on the coercive effect of a particular antidiscrimination
mandate sufficiently protects the autonomy interest recognized in
Hosanna-Tabor while at the same time respecting governments’
interest in prohibiting discrimination. Thus, where the coercion is
total or near total, the autonomy interest insulates religious
organizations from government interference. This is most clearly
evident with a law that requires a religious body, by its mere
existence, to comply with nondiscrimination mandates, as was the
case in Hosanna-Tabor. But, it would also clearly apply when
essential government services are predicated on compliance. For
example, if police and fire protection were predicated on compliance
262. Such a focus on coercion is reminiscent of the Court’s pre-Smith free exercise
jurisprudence, in which it examined the burden general state laws imposed on a particular
religious adherent. Thus, the Court saw the forgoing of unemployment benefits in
Sherbert as highly coercive, putting substantial pressure on Sabbatarians to forgo their
religious beliefs. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403–04 (1963). Similarly, the
school attendance in Yoder was highly coercive, since it mandated compliance. See
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 218 (1972). The analysis would be different, in two
significant respects, however. First, the coercion analysis here would only focus on
potential interference with autonomy interest in the appointment and retention of church
leaders and members, whereas the pre-Smith free exercise analysis applied to coercive
effects on any religious belief or practice. Second, the coercion to abandon beliefs in
Sherbert and Yoder triggered a form of strict scrutiny, where the government action might
still be justified by a compelling government interest. See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406. In
contrast, there is no compelling interest analysis when the autonomy interest is infringed.
263. Christian Legal Soc’y, 130 S. Ct. at 2986.
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with a nondiscrimination mandate, then the autonomy right would
264
apply. Similarly, if the issuance of a license, such as for a homeless
shelter, were contingent on compliance with antidiscrimination
requirements, it would be coercive in the case of a religious
organization because the shelter would not be able to operate without
the license. Although a religiously run homeless shelter can be made
subject to reasonable health, safety, building, and land use
265
requirements—just like any other homeless shelter —the state
cannot interfere in how the organization chooses its leadership.
On the other hand, the coercive effect is substantially less when
compliance with nondiscrimination mandates is a requirement for
participating in a government program that subsidizes a religious
organization’s mission.
As mentioned above, predicating
participation in a limited-public-forum on certain nondiscrimination
requirements imposes only a modest burden on religion, especially
266
under the circumstances described in Christian Legal Society. This
would also apply to a religious organization’s participation in a state
program that distributes funds for social services. Although forgoing
the funds might place financial burdens on the organization’s mission,
it hardly coerces compliance with a nondiscrimination mandate.
Religious organizations certainly have the right to be free of state
interference with their internal affairs, but they do not necessarily
have the right to government subsidies for their mission.
The above analysis simply suggests that a religious organization’s
ability to assert the autonomy interest recognized in Hosanna-Tabor
turns not only on the status of an employee or lay leader, but also on
the context in which an antidiscrimination mandate is imposed. To
the extent that the mandate effectively precludes an organization
from operating absent compliance, either because it constitutes a
direct prohibition or substantially coerces compliance, then the
autonomy interest can be asserted, assuming the other requirements
are met. But, where coercive pressure is more modest, such as
withholding a subsidy, then the autonomy interest does not apply. In
264. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 17 (1947) (discussing that if government
cuts off fire and police protection, connections to sewage disposal, and other services to
religious schools, it would make it difficult for the schools to operate).
265. See Marc-Olivier Langolis, The Substantial Burden of Municipal Zoning: The
Religious Freedom Restoration Act as a Means to Consistent Protection for Churchsponsored Homeless Shelters and Soup Kitchens, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1259, 1280–
84 (1996) (discussing types of permissible restrictions on church-sponsored homeless
shelters).
266. Christian Legal Soc’y, 130 S. Ct. at 2990–92.
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such situations any antidiscrimination mandate poses little threat to a
religious organization’s autonomy over its internal affairs affecting
doctrine, governance, and mission, since the organization can simply
choose to forgo the subsidy and still pursue its mission free of
government interference.

Conclusion
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Hosanna-Tabor, in
which it recognized a “ministerial exception” under the Religion
Clauses to antidiscrimination laws, marks an important, though
limited, development in protecting religious rights. Prior to HosannaTabor, the Court had increasingly resorted to a neutrality paradigm in
resolving religion issues under the First Amendment. Although the
focus on neutrality frequently protected religious interests,
particularly under the Free Speech and Establishment Clauses, it also
failed to accommodate religious interests when they were burdened
under neutral laws. As such, religious interests were increasingly
vulnerable to government interference from general laws, even if the
laws potentially interfered with core beliefs and mission.
In Hosanna-Tabor, however, the Court essentially found that the
Religion Clauses create a sphere of autonomy for religious
organizations in which they are free from government interference,
even from neutral laws. This does not insulate religious organizations
from all government regulation; far from it. But, it should give
religious organizations autonomy over issues that relate to
governance and the formation of doctrine, faith, and mission. Thus,
although the Court in Hosanna-Tabor was careful to limit its holding
to the immediate facts of the case, the underlying concerns that
religious organizations be free of government interference over
matters of faith, doctrine and mission suggest a more expansive
understanding of what the autonomy interest might include. In this
respect, courts should apply a functional approach to the ministerial
exception itself, applying it to any employee who has significant
responsibilities relevant to a religious organization’s faith and
mission. Moreover, the exception should also include lay leaders of
religious organizations and to membership issues, since both impact
faith and mission.
Finally, the autonomy interest is best understood not as
displacing the Court’s prevailing neutrality paradigm, but as limiting
it. For that reason, neutrality will still be the primary standard for
determining religious speech rights and Establishment Clause issues,
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as well as the basis for many Free Exercise issues. This will be true
even where antidiscrimination mandates are required as part of a
government-subsidized forum.
But, where antidiscrimination
mandates act as a direct prohibition or exert substantial coercive
pressure to forgo the right to control the selection of ministers, lay
leaders, and members, then the autonomy interest should insulate
religious groups from such interference.
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